Amin’s downfall begins after 30 months in power

Looking at former president Idi Amin’s first two and half years in power suggests that it was the time he made most of his positive impact, and there after undid whatever he had gained.
His failure to make progress towards the economic and political development of the country was centred on three major factors; degeneration from a democracy to a dictatorship, increased reliance on divisive policies and government’s abated ethnic divide in the military and the population.
The swiftness of the coup’s success is the same with which the hopes of the population evaporated. The January 25, 1971, takeover of government announcement on Radio Uganda at 3:45pm, followed by the invitation of Amin by the military to have him lead the new government, looked a smooth transfer of power.
However, in the first 30 months of Amin’s rule, cracks developed in four major sectors – internal affairs, economics, foreign affairs and military – leading to its weakening and eventual downfall.

Internal politics
Save for Acholi and Lango sub-regions, there was jubilation countrywide to welcome the new government.
According to a Cambridge University press publication titled Military Rule in Uganda the Politics of Survival by F. J. Ravenhill: “There can be no doubt as to Amin’s genuine popularity with large sectors of the ordinary people who were able to identify with him more easily than with intellectual leaders who had been educated overseas.”
“Whereas Obote talked of the common man, Amin is the common man personified,” Ravenhill goes on to say.
After outlining their 18 reasons for the takeover, Amin made his first pronouncements which were to endear him and the military to the population, mostly the Baganda.
The Uganda Argus newspaper of January 27, 1971, reported of Amin’s promise to return the remains of Kabaka Edward Muteesa II and the release of all political prisoners. Among them included the five ministers former president Milton Obote had imprisoned – George Magezi, Dr Emmanuel Lumu, Baraki-Kirya, Grace Ibingira, and Matthias Ngobi.
However, four days after the return of the body, then Foreign Affairs minister Wanume Kibedi reminded a section of Baganda that were asking for the restoration of the kingdom that Uganda was to remain a republic.
The Uganda Argus of October 11, 1971, quoted Amin saying: “I want to take this opportunity to state clearly and categorically that kingdoms will not be re-introduced and Uganda will not go back to the 1962 constitutional set-up.”
Despite his popularity, the regime did not have the expertise needed to run the country. In the cabinet announced on February 2, 1971, beside him there was only one military officer.
To the surprise of many, it also represented a tribal balance. Ravenhill says: “The absence of military figures in the cabinet gave an impression that decisions will be taken somewhere else.”
Despite having a cabinet, Amin trusted the Defence Council for decision making. Ravenhill says Amin listened to soldiers more than the civilians.
“Amin is undoubtedly more willing to listen to fellow officers who hold the key to his survival in power than to either his Cabinet ministers or civil servants,” he says.
Just six months in his rule, Amin made the first cabinet reshuffle following a misunderstanding with some members from West Nile sub-region. He reacted by dismissing Albert Ovonji, from West Nile, followed by Justus Byagagaire in December 1971.
Others like Edward Rugumayo did not wait to be sacked; he resigned while in Nairobi, Kenya, by telegram.
The Contemporary Africa Book of Records of 1973 says he resigned because “I found it increasingly difficult to fulfil my duties in the atmosphere that prevails in our country”.
“I wish you the courage to preserve life; the wisdom to know that man cannot create himself at will; the knowledge to understand that man’s mission here on earth (including yours) is to preserve, improve and prolong life; and to understand that what we do today will determine the destiny of the nation tomorrow, and posterity will judge us by our actions of today,” he wrote.
Next in line was Foreign Affairs minister Wanume Kibedi who was also Amin’s in-law. His abdication was a big blow to Amin, who responded by announcing on February 27, 1973, that he had suspended all ministers from duty for 30 days to allow them have a break.
On matters of legislature, soon after swearing in Amin dissolved Parliament, vesting the legislative powers in the Executive.
In the first year alone, he passed 35 decrees. Among the notable ones included the decree of March 13, 1971, establishing four commissions of inquiry into the National Trading Corporation, the Coffee Marketing Boards, corruption in Government Departments and State Corporations.
Others were decrees of May 18 and 21, 1971, dealing with General Service Department and the reduction of the percentage of shares to be held by the government in private enterprise in Uganda to 49 from 60 per cent.
The Financial Times of January 24, 1972, reacted to the decrees saying, “Uganda is now celebrating the most peculiar of the many examples of African military dictatorship: a soldier who seized power and yet gives every sign of not wanting or not being able to do anything with it. Uganda is scarcely being governed at all.”
Two Decrees, number 9 of 1972 and 4 of 1973, prohibited the wearing of miniskirts, immoral attires and also made abortion a crime against the State.
The Guardian, a UK-based newspaper, of July 29, 1973, reported: “Carrying out abortion in Uganda was a crime against the State and the president and whoever did so was liable for trial before a military tribunal.”
Decree number 7 of 1971 made provision for detention without trial for up to six months in connection with the military takeover, while decree number 15 of May 1971 paved way for detention for an unlimited period.
Decrees in 1972 and 1973 extended the powers of the armed forces to search and arrest. It also made it impossible for the government to be sued for any actions that it takes in the name of maintaining law and order.
Decree 35 of 1972 cut back on freedom of the press allowing government to indefinitely suspend operations of a media outlet.

Military
The coup of January 1971 was achieved by a small but well-organised and well-equipped section of the armed forces. The Uganda military, at the time of the coup, was far from being a homogeneous or disciplined organisation.
Amin appeared to consolidate his rule in the months after the coup, but by July 1971 he was facing a revolt within his forces. To some degree this fighting was precipitated by Amin’s operations to dispose of Acholi and Langi officers.
The July fighting culminated in the November 1972 massacres at the Mutukula prison camp. According to UK newspaper The Observer of December 23, 1972, quoting some of the 19 men who escaped to Tanzania, “in November 41 officers and 32 non-commissioned officers plus another 90 former General Safety Unity officers and close to 500 privates are believed to have been massacred in one day.”

Economic affairs
The huge military expenditure by Amin is the principal cause of his government’s economic failures. According to the Uganda Argus of July 1979, during his trip as president to Britain he purchased 30 Saracen and Saladin armoured cars and modern French weapons. He also spent a lot of money on the construction of military bases at the expense of other economic infrastructure.
In the first three months after the coup, military expenditure rose to Shs234m from Shs103m, and by the end of the year it was close to Shs1b. The economic war he started with the expulsion of Asians did not receive the desired results, instead it worsened the economic situation.

Foreign affairs
Amin’s immediate post-coup challenge was international recognition. Surprisingly, Britain was the first in the Western world to recognise the new regime in Kampala.
In Africa, Ghana, Zaire (DR Congo), Liberia, Nigeria and Malawi were quick to recognise the new regime while Somalia, Zambia, Tanzania, Sudan and Guinea refused to recognise Amin’s government.
Tanzania’s refusal to recognise Amin became a threat to the existence of the East African Community. Besides that, there was the disappearance of both Kenyan and Tanzanians in Uganda working for the East African Community.
Even though Amin was committed to the Arab world, he insisted that Uganda was pursuing a nonalignment policy.
However, a week later he accused the Chinese of training and leading guerrilla forces from Tanzania and producing the body of a ‘Chinese General’ in Kampala (he, in fact, was not a Chinese general but the head of Tanzanian police called Hans Popp).
Other countries saw no reason to abandon Amin. Russia and both the Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany continued giving Amin aid.

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