How Kabaka Muteesa’s deportation was planned

Before his posting to Uganda in 1952, Andrew Cohen had worked on the post-war colonial strategy in London, England.
The Dictionary of National Biography by R. Robinson describes Cohen as “of giant stature and energy, the intellectual dreamer of the colonial office one of the most anti-colonial who finally dismantled the tropical African empire.”
It was his radical progressive plans for the constitutional development of the protectorate as a whole, which precipitated what was for Buganda perhaps the greatest crisis of the colonial regime.
Writing in the Journal of Religion in Africa, Kevin Ward says: “Cohen wanted to integrate Buganda much more closely into the structures of Uganda, so that Uganda as a whole could develop towards greater responsibility and gradual self-government.”
Then Kabaka Edward Muteesa’s deportation is blamed on Buganda’s reaction to a comment by the secretary for colonies, Sir Oliver Lyttelton, on June 30, 1953, during the dinner at the East Africa dinner club in London were he said: “Nor must we exclude from our minds wide measures of unity in East Africa.”
Though to some this remark could have been the cause, it may not have actually been the case. Muteesa and Cohen seem to have started off on a wrong foot.
In his book The Desecration of My Kingdom, Muteesa wrote about his relationship with Cohen, saying: “Cohen’s for a unitary state with a legislative council directly elected could not include me.”
“He failed to see that I enjoyed the total support of my people …. I think he decided that any influence of mine must be destroyed perhaps by discrediting me or by more drastic means.”

Blow to Cohen’s plans
The remarks were a blow to Cohen’s plans of developing a broad representative government as an essential element to Uganda’s self-rule.
Cohen was following the test path in other British colonies that had attained independence – having an expanded local representation first by nomination and then by direct election to the time when a national assembly of elected representatives would be in place.
Though this procedure had worked in other former British colonies, in Uganda it was faced with a different challenge in the form of Buganda Kingdom on which the British had built their creation of the protectorate.
The Buganda government was agreeable with the local councils being elected but where not ready to have an African-led executive council to have supreme powers over the Kabaka.
Writing in the book Looking Back at the Uganda Protectorate: Recollections of District Officers, Owen Griffith, the personal secretary to governor Cohen, says they took refuge in Buganda’s special status under the agreement and used every trick to frustrate Cohen’s plans of constitutional reform as far as Buganda was concerned.
A series of meetings between the protectorate government and Mengo took place at the Government House (State House) in Entebbe.
The Buganda team had the Kabaka himself, Paulo Kavuma the katikkiro (prime minister), Matiya Mugwanya the mulamuzi, and L. M. Mpagi the muwanika.
The protectorate government had governor Andrew Cohen, the chief secretary C. H. Thornely, attorney general R. Dreschfield, secretary for African affairs L. M. Boyd, the Buganda resident J. P. Birch and the senior assistant to the secretary for the African affairs Don Marshal, who was the secretary to the meetings.
According to Griffith, “At the end of each meeting Cohen dictated a telegram to the colonial office reporting the proceedings and his conclusion.”
He goes ahead to say Cohen wanted the negotiations kept secret fearing that once it went out, there could be demonstrations in Buganda.
“The reason for secrecy was twofold; Cohen feared that if the dispute became a public property the attitude of the Baganda would harden…. The overriding reason of Cohen’s fear was based on the views of his advisers that a public quarrel may end up in violence and Cohen was determined to avoid bloodshed,” he says.
With failed progress on the situation, the colonial administration was getting frustrated each passing day. Buganda’s stance was not to have local representation dominated councils beyond the local councils.
Griffith further says: “The Kabaka stubbornly refused either to make or even approve nominations to the legislative council. His attitude was that rather than participate in an increasingly representative central government, Buganda would go alone.”
With Muteesa not willing to tell his Lukiiko (parliament) to give into the Cohen proposals, the colonial administrators had their patience stretched to the limits.
Griffith says Cohen came to a conclusion that, “the future of Uganda was not going to be sacrificed to the obstinacy of one hereditary ruler. The Kabaka had to go.”
According to The Exile of Kabaka Muteesa II by Kevin Ward, Cohen considered that he had given all the assurances needed and feared that Buganda was developing in an isolationist direction which jeopardised his constitutional plans for Uganda as a whole.
“He insisted that the Lukiiko withdraw its demands that Buganda be transferred from colonial office jurisdiction to that of the foreign office and be given a date for separate independence. The Lukiiko refused to withdraw,” Ward writes.
Don Marshal, who was the assistant to the secretary for African affairs and the one taking the minutes of the meetings, said: “After the meeting between the governor and the Kabaka on November 6, 1953, it was a unanimous decision of the senior advisers that the situation had reached a point where it was necessary to contemplate the removal of the Kabaka and contingency plans must be made.”
Having reached that conclusion, it was put to the colonial office in London and it was informed of the governor’s decision. The colonial office did not want the Kabaka deported.
Secretary of colonies Lyttelton offered to come to Uganda and meet Muteesa. However, the governor rejected the offer, saying: “Such a meeting would only inflate the Kabaka’s ego and obstinacy.”
Cohen went ahead to suggest that instead the meeting be held in London and should they fail to reach an agreement, Muteesa should not be allowed to return.
Lyttelton rejected the option on the grounds that other traditional leaders will take an invitation to London as a kiss of death.
At the end of the day, Cohen had his way and he went ahead with the deportation plan.

Deportation plan
Having exhausted all possibilities and realising that Muteesa and his ministers were not changing their positions, it was decided that the only option was to deport him.
The communication between Cohen and the colonial secretary was kept secret; the telegrams sent to Cohen were kept in his personal safe in Government House.
“I personally delivered the telegrams,” says Griffith.
On the deportation day, Muteesa was given a last chance to sign an assurance that he will cooperate with the constitutional changes.
“If he refused to sign he would be deported there and then. If he did sign we would, all of us, have gone to our graves with this secret,” Griffith says.
As the deportation was planned, there was an anticipation of violence once the news of the deportation broke out.
A contingency security plan to curb any violence was put in place. The 4th Battalion of the Kings African Rifles was consequently brought back from Kenya were they were engaged in the campaign against the Mau-Mau. A second battalion was poised inside the Kenya border for reinforcement if necessary.
Griffith, who had been part of the plot for the deportations, says: “It was arranged that two Hercules aircrafts of RAF [Royal Air Force] transport command should land at Entebbe airport on the day in question. They landed very early that morning.” On the appointed date everything went according to plan.
“The Kabaka and his ministers arrived at the Government House at mid-morning. Knowing they were coming for the usual meeting. I was not to attend that meeting. Cohen made a final earnest attempt to persuade the Kabaka to sign the final assurances,” Griffith writes.
“It was arranged that when it became apparent that the Kabaka would refuse to sign, the attorney general was to leave the meeting to make ready the constitutional documents for the declaration of the emergency and arrest for the governor’s signature.”
“After a pause Cohen would leave the meeting to sign the documents. The chief secretary had the unpleasant task of pretending to keep the negotiations until the arrival of the commissioner of police, whose duty would be to arrest the Kabaka and escort him to the airport.”
Griffith explains how a phone call was made to the government printer in Entebbe to print pamphlets explain the deportation.
Two police officers had been earmarked to escort Muteesa into exile without their notice. Marshal says Freddie Williams, who was well known to Kabaka, had been summoned from his office and handed a raincoat and told he was going to London with the Kabaka. Austin Malcolm from the special branch also had no prior notice of the journey to London with the Kabaka.
The police commissioner was waiting for the summons to effect the arrest and Marshal, who was in the room with him, says: “The commissioner of police entered the room and served the deportation order to the Kabaka.”
There was a police car waiting outside to take Muteesa to the airport. “As he was being led to police car he was deeply shocked and looked angry. The ministers also looked with shock,” explains Griffith.

Next week read about Muteesa in London, the reaction from Mengo, public and the church,
and the king’s eventual return home

Escort’s recollections

In Looking Back at the Uganda Protectorate: Recollections of District Officers, one of the two police officers who escorted Muteesa says on the way to the airport, Muteesa was made to sit in between him and the commissioner of police, Mr Deegan.
“The car drew up close to the RAF plane of the VIP flight with its engines already running. The Kabaka was told he could nominate one of his people to accompany him, and we were joined by Robert Ntambi, his personal ADC. Soon as we took off, Austin asked the Kabaka and his ADC whether they had any weapons; they each produced an automatic pistol,” writes Williams.
When the plane taking Muteesa left, it landed at El Adam in Libya to refuel. From there Muteesa asked to be allowed to send a telegram to Kampala but his escorts refused.
“I assumed the telegram was to his Lukiiko and people to rise and oppose the oppressors who had deported him,” Williams writes.
Though the exact departure time from Entebbe was not mentioned, it must have been during day time having started the staged meeting mid-morning of November 30, 1953.
Williams says, “We arrived in the early morning hours of December 1 at the RAF station of Tangmere and were given breakfast at officers’ mess. The Kabaka said he did not want breakfast and was left with his ADC in a small guest lounge with the morning papers.”

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