Congo crisis: Making sense of Kabila, United Nations and M23 insurgency

M23 rebels patrol a road in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo recently. PHOTO BY AFP

Another report by the United Nations’ group of experts on the DR Congo was recently leaked to the press causing a media and diplomatic frenzy.
The highlight of the findings is that the governments of Rwanda and Uganda support armed rebels fighting the DR Congo government.

The most significant aspect of these recent reports is President Kabila’s conspicuous diplomatic offensive to portray Uganda and Rwanda as villains and the consequent aid cuts to Rwanda. Some background is necessary.

The Congo File
On January 20 2008, Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) troops crossed into the DR Congo territory to undertake joint operations with the Congolese army (FARDC). Code named Umoja Wetu (Our Unity), the operation was a major offensive against Rwandan armed rebels with bases in the Congolese provinces of Nord Kivu and Sud Kivu.

This unity though was not to last: civil and political groups in Kinshasa protested against President Kabila’s decision to invite Rwandan troops to operate on Congolese soil.

As high a personality as the Speaker of the Lower House in Kinshasa (hitherto a President Kabila ally) made public his discontent over Rwandan troops on the DRC soil. Four legislators also threatened to resign their seats in protest.

President Kabila, realising his tenuous hold on power in Kinshasa could unravel over the issue, had to do something: Rwandan troops had to leave Congolese soil. And so, on February 26 2008, RDF troops left the DRC.

But then, the departure of the RDF was actually the beginning of the current M23 crisis: because these Rwandan troops remained (or returned during the night) in the DRC under some secret agreement (at summit level) between Kabila and Kagame.

In the spirit of Umoja Wetu, the two presidents agreed that Rwandan troops would ‘secretly’ continue carrying out joint operations with Congolese troops under a new operation code named Amani Leo (Peace Now).

However, Kabila demanded that Kagame should remove Gen. Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the rebel National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), from the political and security equation of eastern DRC.

And as it were, a mutiny broke out in the CNDP. Gen. Laurent was ousted and replaced by Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, who readily accepted to be integrated into the Congolese army. CNDP as a rebel group wound up.

A man who keeps his word, President Kagame arrested and detained Gen. Nkunda on Thursday January 22, 2008. However, he was clever enough not to hand Gen. Nkunda over to Kinshasa where he was the subject of an international arrest warrant. To date, Gen. Nkunda is still under detention in Rwanda.

The arrest of Gen. Nkunda was an unambiguous response to the December 2007 UN report accusing Kagame of arming and supplying men, arms and ammo to Gen. Nkunda. It also recast Kagame as an enabler of peace in the region.

Enter ICC
On March 14, 2012, Thomas Lubanga became the first person to be convicted by the ICC. Gen. Ntaganda is alleged to have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity while serving under Gen. Lubanga in Ituri Region in eastern DRC.

Lubanga’s guilty verdict was hailed by international civil society organisations as a legal landmark in the fight against perpetrators of war crimes. Geraldine Mattioli-Zeltner of Human Rights Watch, said: “With Lubanga found guilty, (Gen. Bosco) Ntaganda’s continued freedom from arrest is a shameful betrayal of the victims. The Congolese authorities should immediately arrest Ntaganda and turn him over to the ICC.”

Anthony Lake, Unicef’s executive director was also quoted as saying that “the conviction of Thomas Lubanga by the ICC sends a clear message to all armed groups.” Energised by the success of the Lubanga case, the prosecution arm of the ICC has been on the prowl. And a non-state player like Gen. Ntaganda, with no background in ideological pursuits, is good game.

And so, in spite of all the assurances that he would never hand over Gen. Ntaganda to the ICC, Kabila buckled; he agreed to co-operate. In response to the rumour of an impending arrest, Gen. Ntaganda resorted to mutiny, citing unpaid salaries and inhumane living conditions for soldiers under his command.

However, on April 4, what had been hitherto been classified as a mutiny became a full-blown rebellion when Ntaganda loyalist soldiers attacked Congolese troops at Mwesa.
And on April 11, President Kabila officially issued ‘the long awaited’ arrest warrant for Ntaganda. To complicate matters, Kabila said he would not rule out transferring Gen. Ntaganda to the ICC. Incidentally that was the route that took Lubanga in The Hague.
Gen. Ntaganda went into hiding and all of a sudden, what had began as a mutiny morphed into a full scale ‘liberation movement’ complete with a name: the March 23 Movement or M23 as we now know it). Gen. Ntaganda claimed he was not their leader.

Political Diplomatics
The first indication that things were not going to be easy was what was described by Ugandan media as President Kagame’s ‘secret visit’ to Kampala on June 12.
The situation became even clearer when two days later on June 15, the UN Security Council issued a statement calling for a full investigation following reports of external support to armed groups in the DRC.

Three days later on Monday June 18, Ms Louise Mushikiwabo, Rwanda’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, went to Kinshasa to discuss the situation in eastern DRC. However, very uncharacteristic of the Congolese government, they also engaged in a concerted diplomatic offensive. Mr. Raymond Tshibanga, Congo’s Foreign Minister, came to Kampala, went to Dar-es-Salaam, Bujumbura and Angola to discuss the security situation in eastern DRC and ‘the involvement of a neighbouring country’.

Frustrated, President Kagame threatened to release Gen. Nkunda from the leash holding him in Rwanda. He even made a revelation to local and foreign journalists in Kigali that some foreign powers had planned to topple the Kinshasa regime.

Kabila beats Kagame
All over a sudden, President Kabila looks and sounds ‘smarter’ than hitherto thought. He could even afford to call one of his colleagues “the bad boy of the region”. Of course that sounds like a line dropped by a western diplomat.

And when he told Ugandan journalists that the Ugandan government was going to make a better response than dismissing the UN report as rubbish, indeed formal explanations were issued by Kampala.

Which brings us to the question: what has turned Kabila’s diplomatic stock with western powers? The answer is Gen. Ntaganda. The western powers want Ntaganda in the The Hague and anyone with (or thought to be with) the capacity to obstruct his arrest is likely to have issues with them (western powers).

But Gen. Ntaganda knows a lot; the smell from his trial is likely to pollute some regional capitals. That’s why he is more likely to die before he reaches The Hague. His appearance in The Hague could cause more trouble than is expected to cure.

Asuman Bisiika is the Executive Editorof East Africa Flagpost