For Africans, the ICC is more about politics than delivering justice

Playing political games? Basing on the just concluded ruling on the Ocampo Six suspects in connection with the Kenyan post-election violence, Saturday Monitor analyses ICC’s actions against Africans. Are they aimed at satisfying political egos or delivering justice?

The International Criminal Court at The Hague on Monday confirmed charges against four of the top six Kenyans charged with crimes against humanity following the deadly 2008 post-election violence in Kenya.

Deputy prime minister and minister of Finance Uhuru Kenyatta, former Higher Education minister William Ruto, Head of Civil Service Francis Muthaura, and Kass FM programmes chief Joshua Sang will have to defend themselves at the court while former police boss Maj. Gen. Hussein Ali and former Industrialisation minister Henry Kosgey were let off the hook.

One issue of discussion the hugely anticipated--at least in Kenya-- ICC decision throws up, is how its rulings have tended to change the political orientation of African countries. It is a question that will interest most Kenyans as their country comes in for some sustained focus from the world this week in the wake of the confirmation and rejection of charges against the suspects.

The ICC, with 120 states as parties to the Rome Statute that established it, has seven active investigations, all in Africa. (This has long been a criticism of the court, but it may be worth noting that it is also weighing up complaints from 10 other countries, only two of which are African).

The court has indicted or formally charged 27 Africans under three groups of offences: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is yet to convict any, but has now dismissed charges against four while terminating two other cases on accounts of death.

The countries with active court cases are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central Africa Republic, Kenya, Sudan, Libya and Cote d’Ivoire.

Reactions in these countries towards confirmation of charges by the ICC have seemed to in part depend on how the process was initiated, and what was at stake.

Sparked protests
In Sudan, the confirmation of charges against President Omar al-Bashir—the court’s highest profile victim yet—sparked mass demonstrations after thousands took to the streets of the capital Khartoum in protest.

It was the first time that a sitting President had been formally charged, and matters were made more complicated by the issuance of an arrest warrant against Mr Bashir, who the court considers a fugitive.

Mr Bashir said the ICC could “eat” the warrant and that it was not “worth the ink it is written on”.

The court does not have a police force to enforce warrants, and backed by an African Union decision not to honour the warrant, Mr Bashir has been able to travel to ICC member countries such as Malawi, Chad, Djibouti and interestingly, Kenya.

Sudan as official policy does not co-operate with the court having opted out of the establishing Rome Statute, a situation that has seen another indictee, former Interior minister Ahmed Haroun, continue to freely play an active role in the political landscape.

Other suspects charged with crimes especially related to Darfur continue to roam free such as Janjaweed militia leader Ali Abdul Rahman, while cases against rebel leaders Abdalla Banda and Saleh Jerbo are at their pre-trial stage.

So thorny was the issue that the issuance of an arrest warrant by a Kenyan court in November for President Bashir sparked off a storm in bilateral relations between Khartoum and Nairobi.

In Uganda, the five indictees have been members of the murderous and feared Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group, leading to public opinion towards the court being largely favourable.