UGANDA'S FLAWED ELECTIONS: How the media was misused in the election

86. Certainly, in the last days of the campaign, the activities of all the parties were adequately reported. There were speeches by party leaders and discussion programmes devoted to party manifestoes. Short biographies of all candidates were given on the radio. The Current Affairs Section of Radio Uganda made attempts to bring a measure of even-handedness to its own programmes, but the section providing news for both radio and television continued to reflect a pro-UPC bias in its output.

87. The number of radios in working order was limited and they were expensive to run. Many were looted after Liberation, when the Ministry of Information estimated that numbers fell from three to one million. A single battery cost 50 Uganda Shillings (about £3 at the official rate of exchange), making it difficult for the average Ugandan to maintain a set, in the unlikely event that he could acquire one. Television's impact was even smaller 88. Difficult though it is to assess the precise importance of the media's role in an election, certain factors assist us in concluding that in Uganda it was a limited one. Both press and radio were restricted in the number of people they could reach each party had some form of media support and towards the end of the election campaign, radio and television coverage was extended to all the parties.

89. Just as there was a parallel economy, so there was a parallel "radio" - Radio Katwe, the medium spreading news by word of mouth from one end of the country to the other. The Minister of Information was the first to admit its potency. Here there could be no question of official management, for each party was free to invoke it to serve its interests. The Campaign

90. The principal aspect of the election campaign which concerned us was whether there was adequate freedom of movement and expression, enabling all parties to put their case to the electors

91. We have already commented on the role of the media and now deal with some other factors.

92. Before our arrival in Uganda, we had heard the view expressed that the Tanzanian forces in the country were politically partisan and would seek to influence the outcome of the poll. We wish to place on record, however, that this was not the view of any of the party leaders in Uganda. On the contrary, all affirmed that no election could possibly be held without the Tanzanian presence to maintain law and order. The Chairman of the Military Commision told us that the size of the Ugandan Police Force had shrunk from 20,000 to 5,000, most of the men fresh to their job. The DP went so far as to suggest to us that they would welcome the presence of the Tanzanian Police in polling stations and that if any " sections of 1'he Army were required to be brought out of barracks on polling day they would prefer them to be Tanzanian rather than Ugandan.

93. If the Tanzanian presence was seen as neutral, the Ugandan National Liberation Army was widely regarded as ill-controlled, undisciplined and partisan.

94. There were, nevertheless, some accusations from DP and UPM candidates and supporters in Grlu and Kitgum districts of harassment prior to polling day by the Ugandan army in particular and to a lesser extent by UPC supporters. Several candidates alleged they had been detained at both official and unofficial road-blocks set up by army personnel; some claimed that they had been threatened by soldiers at their homes and told not to campaign in certain areas under pain of death; some other claimed that they were physically assaulted or their homes and families attacked by men in military uniform. Whether .these alleged attacks were committed by Ugandan army personnel or by their militia remains uncertain. The aggrieved parties were convinced however that most if not all the attacks were politically motivated

95. The complaints of .intimidation in the north were one-sided, there being no counter-claims of harassment of UPC candidates or supporters. However, given the extent of UPC support in the area it must be doubted whether, in the absence of intimidation, the election result would have been any different.

96. In the Kampala district, where curfew and nightly gunfire were facts of life, there were charges of politically-related acts of violence. Most notable among these was the claim by DP officials from the Kampala West constituency regarding an attack by Uganda army personnel on a political rally which resulted in the death of a seven year old child. The DP alleged that known UPC supporters within the army had been detained following the incident but later released. As was the case in other districts our attempts to follow up these allegations were fruitless as the police found themselves powerless to help in situations where allegations were made against the army.

97. In Kasese, where there were allegations of attempts to intimidate, it was clear that the election campaign provided the occasion for a revival of earlier ethnic animosities. There remain, however, serious questions regarding the disappearance and killing of a prospective DP candidate in Kasese, Victor Muhil The UPC too brought complaints of harassment, intimidation and violence directed against its supporters in the southern part of the country.

98. In truth, we were surprised not that allegations of intimidation were being made but that they were, in the context of Uganda and our experience in some other countries, of such a limited character.

Nevertheless, we judged it prudent to do all in our power to eliminate all possibility of intimidation becoming a grievance on polling day. Having personally witnesses the delays and occasional harassment of civilians at road blocks and being conscious of their potential for abuse on polling day we urged the Chairman of the Military Commission to ensure that they were removed throughout the country on 10 December. It is gratifying that our suggestion was accepted. We also urged that all military personnel be confined to barracks on that day as we feared that their very presence in the vicinity of polling stations might be construed as being oppressive.

Our suggestion in this respect was also accepted and acted upon. We have no doubt that these two decisions on the part of the Military Commission made an enormous contribution to the psychological climate in which polling took place.

99. By way of further reassurance we also asked the leaders of all four political parties to subscribe to a joint' statement asking their followers to eschew violence of any kind in the interest of a peaceful poll. This they readily agreed to do. The text of their joint appeal is at Annexe. It was broadcast on the radio and received wide publicity.