NRA attack on Kabamba causes tension between rebel groups

NRA Bush War comrades Col Kizza Besigye, Maj Amanya Mushega, Maj Kaka, Maj Tom Butime (R) and other colleagues during the struggle.

For the last 30 years, every February 6, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), which evolved from the National Resistance Army (NRA) celebrates Tarehe Sita.

This is the day when the Popular Resistance Army (PRA), led by Yoweri Museveni, then a guerrilla leader, attacked Kabamba Military Barracks in Mubende District.

That attack also marked the beginning of a five-year guerrilla war against the elected government of president Apollo Milton Obote.

Mr Museveni claimed the election had been rigged, although his Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) was never a lead contender in the election.

Frederick Guweddeko, a researcher and PhD fellow at Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR), reveals another side to the attack on Kabamba Military Barracks. Guweddeko fought in the liberation war in which he was a commanding officer – combat operations.

“The political situation at the beginning of 1981 was one of anticipated war,” Guweddeko says, adding, “There were three armed groups just waiting for the elections to end. They were also waiting for Museveni, who was still part of the government, to join them.”

In February 1981, Guweddeko had just reported to Old Kampala Secondary School where he was in Senior Six. However, he also belonged to the Urban Unit of Prof Yusuf Kironde Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) – known as the Buganda Army.

A month earlier, he had ‘liberated’ a gun from a white Fiat Rivoli belonging to a Tanzanian adjutant.

When the adjutant came to the school, looking for Guweddeko, his contacts arranged for him to go to the forests between Matugga and Kapeeka, where Prof Lule’s army was stationed. By February 6, he was in Matugga.

The three armed groups
UFF was utilising the forests in Mukono, Luweero, and Mubende.

“Our group was working with a man called Mule, who was our liaison to Museveni. He was to bring Museveni to our group. Museveni was needed because he claimed to have a unit, Kikosi Vita, consisting of 10,000 soldiers whom he had integrated in the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA).”

Museveni claimed that when he began fighting, Kikosi Vita would join him. He also claimed to have in his command 10,000 trained Rwandan refugees who had been prevented from joining the UNLA.

“Museveni convinced Lule that when the war began these refugees would join, making a potentially larger fighting group.”

The second armed group, Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), belonged to Dr Andrew Lutakome Kayiira and was fighting in Mpigi and Masaka.

“Kayiira’s army was waiting for Museveni’s Kikosi Vita so when he made his attacks, these fighters would not fight for the UNLA, but would instead join him.”

The third group, called the communists by the other fighters, belonged to Prof Edward Rugumayo and Prof Dani Wadada Nabudere, and rotated around Tooro. They were the Gang of Four, whose political leadership was in exile.

“The communists were weak and did not have any supporter to send arms. Their sponsor, Yugoslav president Marshal (Josip Broz) Tito had just died (May 4, 1980). But they had a plan. They wanted to attack Kabamba Military Barracks to get guns.”

The question of arms
Both Kayiira and Lule were waiting for arms from Libya which were going to be delivered though a Muganda clearing agent and transporter.
“They did not want any insecurity to jeopardise the delivery of the guns. Any chaos would cause the UNLA to set up roadblocks. Kayiira had already received some arms and was waiting for another consignment.”

Guweddeko admits that he is not aware whether Museveni knew of these plans but, “Libya had forced all of the fighting groups to work together as a condition of support. When you are in the same business you end up knowing each other’s plans so I think he knew.”

Why Museveni needed these groups
According to Guweddeko, although then Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi was supporting Kayiira and Lule, he could not support Museveni.

“He had fought Amin’s regime which Gaddafi had been supporting since the death of King Faisal (bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Saudi monarch).

Secondly, in fighting Amin, Museveni was working with Israel. So he had to ally himself with one of the groups to access Gaddafi ’s arms.”
In 1972, president Amin had expelled Israeli military advisers. The Israeli’s were also involved in heavy construction work all over the country.

“Amin’s State Research Bureau (SRB) had files on Museveni showing his collaboration with the Israelis. The intellectual side of SRB was run by Palestinians sponsored by Libya. In fact, the director, Maj Farouk Minawa, made life difficult for Museveni.”

The questionable Rwandan refugees
Whereas Lule and Rugumayo wanted Museveni, Kayiira did not want anything to do with him personally.

“He only wanted the soldiers in Kikosi Vita. Kayiira, Mugerwa and (Francis) Bwengye were opposed to Museveni bringing Rwandan refugees into the war. They said under Amin, refugees from Sudan, Zaire and Rwanda had been part of the government machinery that had killed Ugandans.”

These refugees, according to Guweddeko, belonged to the Acholi Shuli of South Sudan lead by Col Yusuf Adek, the Nubians led by Brig Hussein Malera, and the Congolese Lugbara and Kakwa.

“Kayiira did not want any more refugees in Uganda’s armed forces, so this was his first problem with Museveni.”

The attack on Kabamba
When Museveni decided to attack Kabamba Barracks, he collaborated with the Gang of Four.
“Rugumayo sent unarmed soldiers commanded by (Emmanuel) Kafuniza to attack Kabamba and get guns. They were to collaborate with Museveni.
I do not know who was to lead but that attack was more important to Rugumayo’s group than to Museveni.”

Guweddeko says Museveni’s group delayed and Kafuniza and his group were forced to withdraw.
“As they were waiting, this one (Museveni) come with very few people, about 35 and one lorry, and they attacked Kabamba. They could not capture arms because they were few so it was a useless attack. It just served to cause problems.”

He goes on to say Kafuniza and his group had a better plan than Museveni’s group: “They had the real plan. I have talked to Kafuniza about this, so he cannot deny it.”

The betrayal
At the time of the Kabamba attack, Lule and Kayiira were still waiting for arms from Libya. And they needed peace to prevail until they got those arms.

“By attacking Kabamba, Museveni caused insecurity and the UNLA placed roadblocks everywhere. The guns could not reach us.

The second betrayal was that Lule was waiting for Museveni to join him after the 1980 elections, but instead he joined another group and attacked Kabamba.”

At Kabamba, Museveni allied himself with the Gang of Four who had been instrumental in ousting president Lule. They were perceived to be against Buganda’s interests. Kayiira also felt betrayed because the attack failed his plans for the guns.

The aftermath
Because of the betrayal, Guweddeko says Museveni found himself isolated.

“The forests in Buganda were occupied by UFF and UFM. Those in Tooro belonged to the communists.

His base was with the Bafumbira, Bakiga, and Banyankole but all these supported UPC, and there were no forests in Ankole for him to hide in. So he retreated to Bunyoro.”

For UFF to get Gaddafi’s support, they had to accept to recruit some Baganda Muslims who had been in the SRB. They were hiding in Kiboga.

“Museveni linked with Lule through those Muslims. He was still with our liaison, Mule. He asked to join Lule but we were all angry with him. The Muslims brought him to Lule’s headquarters in Matugga where a meeting was held in the home of Kyobe.”

It was a heated meeting, according to the information Guweddeko says he got from Kyobe. They wanted to know why Museveni had attacked Kabamba.

“He defended himself saying the attack was to alert his people in UNLA to desert and join him. He said if Lule joined him, his soldiers would flock to the bush.”

When Museveni reached an agreement with Lule, they went to see Kayiira who was very bitter.
“He said Museveni had delayed the war by attacking Kabamba.

The government was now aware of the rebel activities and the guns from Libya would not arrive in time. He asked, ‘Why didn’t you first contact us? Why didn’t you wait until our guns entered the country?’”

The communists lose hope
One effect of the attack was that Rugumayo’s group had to give up fighting because their only hope of getting arms had been dashed.
“That attack destroyed Rugumayo’s war,”
Guweddeko says, adding, “He had been waiting for Kabamba to start his war but he just gave up. I do not know whether he (Rugumayo) would have succeeded but war is not about winning. Is al-Shabaab fighting to win? It is a business; you fight to fight. Kabamba had been their project. Museveni hijacked it, went alone, and spoilt it.”

Some members of Rugumayo’s army returned home, while some joined the NRA. Guweddeko says if Museveni had not attacked Kabamba, the war would have been shorter.

“Our arms would have arrived from Libya and the communists would have armed themselves from Kabamba, making us many fighting groups.”