Why Nile-sharing countries have no choice but to cooperate

The commencement of construction of the $6.4b (Shs22 trillion) Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), then known as Project X, coincided with the toppling in Egypt of President Hosni Mubarak. But as soon as the dust settled, Egypt was ready for war. To Cairo this was an even bigger threat than the crisis at home.
Mubarak’s successor, Mr Mohamed Morsi, was in subsequent months outted by Wikileaks for having engaged in maneuvers (together with Sudan) to ‘bomb’ the 6,000megawatts dam project in a bid to protect their stake on River Nile.

Egypt, which lies downstream and according to agreements negotiated during the colonial era (1929/1959) claims 75 percent the river’s waters, was long opposed to the mega dam, which it believed would reduce the amount it gets. On the other hand, Ethiopia, which generates nearly 85 percent of the water that flows to Egypt via the Blue Nile, always argued that available studies indicated the dam would not reduce water availability downstream.

The feud over the dam added to a historic pattern of bellicose exchanges over sharing the world’s longest river. For example, in 1979 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat threatened war on violators of his country’s rights to Nile waters while in 1988, then Egyptian Foreign minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who later became United Nations Secretary General) warned that the next war in the Middle East could be triggered by the river.
When Tanzania planned construction of the Lake Victoria pipeline in 2004 to ease water access to 420,000 people in the Tabora region, Egypt threatened to bomb the construction site claiming that it needed that water to flow northward into the Aswan Dam. The plan was revitalised in 2011 but it still provoked jitters from Cairo.

Relations between Egypt and Sudan on one side, and Ethiopia on the other, soured for some time until a compromise brokered by various actors was reached.
The compromise, the Declaration of Principles of the GERD signed in 2015 by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, according to international water law expert Dr Salman M. A. Salman, was the “first consensus over the Nile in a very long time”.
He argued that if “there is any willingness”, this could serve as a “guide” for broader consensus on the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), or what they call the Entebbe Agreement, which seeks to replace the colonial agreements on sharing the river.

The framework outlines ten principles, among others, not causing significant damage, good faith, fair and appropriate use of water, development, trust building, dam security and unity and territorial integrity of the state, to guide the three countries on using the river.
Yet the pact does not invalidate the colonial agreements Egypt is still clinging onto. Experts have postulated that the principles it espouses could be a model on reaching agreement on Article 14 of the CFA, whose main ideals are equitable and reasonable utilisation of the Nile, especially by the upstream Nile countries.

Egypt & thirsty neighbours at odds
For the most part of the past few centuries, historians say the Nile has been a source of tensions and to some extent conflicts, particularly among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The International community, increasingly interested in this part of the world, has been central in pushing for dialogue, which subsequently led to establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999 as platform for dealing with grievances.
This dialogue was also premised on the growing need for water by countries sharing the Nile for, among other things, agriculture/irrigation, electricity generation and a growing population meaning more stress on the Nile, whose flow can only reduce due to climatic conditions.

Agriculture, according to a research titled ‘Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate’ published by the Hydrological Sciences Journal, accounts for 75 percent of total water withdrawal in the Nile Basin. In both Egypt and Ethiopia, agriculture accounts for 86 percent of water withdrawal, while in the case of Sudan it takes 94 percent. Rainwater contributes significantly to agriculture in the upstream countries.

The Nile basin covers an area of around 3 million square kilometers, or approximately 10
per cent of the landmass of the continent.
Worry over the river, the paper shows, started after the construction of the first Aswan Dam in 1889, when Egypt started to fear about the probable exploitation of the water resource in the upstream areas.
“Egypt was [also] increasingly becoming suspicious of British policy to increase cotton production in Sudan” while at the same time Britain, which similarly colonised the upstream countries [Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania] was using the Nile waters for “carrot and stick” diplomacy against Egyptian nationalism.

Consequently, between 1891 and 1925 Britain entered into five agreements on the utilisation of the Nile waters, according to another paper published by the German political foundation Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Agreements that include similar clauses were signed between Belgium concerning the Congo (1894), with the Ethiopian empire (1902), with France, and also with Italy.
The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, whose purpose was to guarantee and facilitate an increase in the volume of water reaching Egypt, is regarded as the most controversial. The Agreement also expressed recognition by Great Britain of Egypt’s “natural and historic rights in the waters of the Nile”, even though the precise content of these rights was not elaborated.
It specifically held that no irrigation or power works, or measures are to be constructed or carried out on the River Nile or its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows in the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which would in such a manner as to entail prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantities of water arriving in Egypt.

In 1952 the Owen Falls agreement was signed that facilitated construction of the Owen falls Dam in Uganda, indicating that the Ugandan government could take any action it considered desirable before or after the construction of the dam, provided that it did so after consultation and with the consent of the Egyptian government.
“In other words, the Egyptian interests in the flow of the Nile waters, as defined in the 1929 Nile Agreement, remained predominant, and Uganda’s sovereign right to deal with its dam was made subject to the established and future Egyptian rights and interests,” the Konrad-Adenauer paper reads in part.

Another [bilateral] agreement was entered in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan stipulating full utilisation of the Nile waters and apportioning annual water quotas, 55.5 billion cubic meters and 18.5 billion cubic meters, respectively, which when combined represent average annual river flow.
The paper concludes that the colonial Nile Water Treaties completed before all the upstream states attained independence are no longer binding and operational, an interpretation Egypt rejects.
Arbitration by a neutral court under international law has similarly been suggested on various occasions, although current international law concerning international fresh water resources has been vague and generally not accepted by states.

Quest for cooperation
At the signing of the CFA, officials from the other countries said they were “tired of first getting permission from Egypt before using River Nile water for any project”, which rests its powers in the colonial agreements. The CFA allows Riparian countries to construct dams and undertake related projects, contrary to the restrictions of the colonial agreements. Egypt’s Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Abdul Gheit warned at the signing of the CFA that his country’s waters are a “red line” and a threat to the country’s national security.
Sudan had initially put a freeze on participation in all NBI activities, including not signing the CFA, in June 2010, but given the need for allies in the region it made U-turn three years later. On return, Khartoum reasoned: “If you are away your voice cannot be heard; if you are around you observe and acknowledge the interests of others and others will observe your interests.”
President Museveni revealed early this month that they are keen on having Cairo on the table. Whereas none of the other Nile Riparian states can match Egypt’s diplomatic clout, they cannot afford to look on as the status quo continues.

President el-Sisi was in Uganda last December for a one-day visit, during which he is thought to have discussed the Nile, among other issues, with President Museveni. The duo are also thought to have discussed the situation in South Sudan. Earlier this year, President el-Sisi visited President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya in a move that observers interpreted as an attempt to rally allies against Addis Ababa.
On his part, Ethiopia’s Hailemariam Desalegn met President Museveni in February for talks about matters which are thought to have revolved around the Nile and South Sudan. The two principals talked up the need to resolve the deadlock over the Nile sharing and Mr Museveni seemed to swipe at Egypt over refusing to sign the CFA.

The CFA came into force in May 2010, signed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi also signed it in 2011.
The CFA is expected to replace the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) once al members sign it. The NBI was set up in 1999 to steer cooperation on the river, with a permanent Nile Basin Commission which will set clear procedures for water sharing, allowing for equal access to the Nile’s waters and annulling the colonial era agreements after years of deadlock on the issue.
The Commission established under article 15 is expected to be based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and have representation from all the Nile Riparian countries. This will have more powers than the current NBI and is expected to be charged with developing procedural matters on the river.

Egypt says it is not opposed to the CFA but that as the country most dependent on the Nile, it needs to be sure that its concerns are catered for. The former Egyptian ambassador to Uganda, Mr Ahmed Aziz Mostafa, told this newspaper last year that what his country wants are “assurances”, which he said are not captured in the agreement.
“There can never be working together when one of the partners has worries,” Mr Mostafa said, “We should all have a shared vision and at the same time feel comfortable working together collectively.”