Lies drove Amin to strike Tanzania

April 2012 marked 33 years since the downfall of Idi Amin’s government. Bernard Rwehururu’s book, Cross to the Gun, gives an eye witness account and sheds light on the factors that contributed to demise of Amin’s regime.

“The attack took the few ill equipped troops that were stationed at Mutukula and Munzilo, by surprise. They could do little to counter the force and so they fled the area. Encouraged by the little resistance that they had met, Butabika who claimed to have been in Masaka by accident, rung Amin claiming that Tanzanian troops had made an incursion into Uganda, prompting him to take over command at the border guard in order to repulse the invaders,” he adds.

According to the Rwehururu, “Amin fell for the lie largely because he desired to see the political boundaries of Uganda redrawn. The so-called incursion into Uganda presented itself as an opportunity for him to annex big chunks of Tanzanian territory. He therefore sanctioned Butabika’s southward campaign to Kyaka Bridge through Kasambya. Though the troops did not cross Kyaka Bridge, they had effectively sealed off the entire Kagera salient and on November 1, excited with the achievements of his errant officers, Amin went on air and announced that his government had annexed the Kagera salient.”

“Two days later, Butabika and his men, ignorant of military amphibious operations and the availability of emergency pontoon bridges, asked Amin to sanction air raids on the bridge. Approval was immediately given, but inadequate firepower and poor marksmanship on the part of our jet pilots failed the operation.”

“It was only ballistics experts from Kilembe Mines were orderd (ordered) to take over the operation that the bridge was finally blown up, sparking off wild celebrations. Gang rape, murder and the looting of all manner of goods and household property, followed the celebrations. Quarrels however soon erupted between several senior officers and their subordinates over the loot,” he adds. “In Dar-es-Salaam, Nyerere and Obote had reason to thank God.

They had never been able to advance any reason to justify military action against Uganda. Uganda handed them the reasons by advancing into Tanzanian territory, blowing up Kyaka Bridge on the Kagera River and annexing what has come to be known as the Kagera salient. Tanzania had the right to defend itself and here was the justification the two men needed,” Rwehururu says.

Towards the end of November 1978, Rwehururu, who was then a Major and Provincial Economic Crimes Tribunal Chairman was given new tasks that included guarding and patrolling the Uganda-Tanzania border, training and shaping the recruits who had been transferred to Mutukula into good soldiers.

Soon the Tanzanian People’s Defence Forces (TPDF) attacked Uganda through the Mutukula border with a Soviet-made BM 21 Katyusha multi-barrel artillery piece, which later came to be known as saba saba in Uganda. “What we had expected to be a week’s shelling turned out to be far beyond that. The shelling went on for weeks dealing a serious blow to the morale of my men. It was then that we reached a decision to request for air support against what was by then a mysterious artillery piece,” Rwehururu reveals.

“The intention was to have it located and destroyed, but the enemy seems to have thought a head of us. They had acquired SAM7s which harassed and destroyed some of the MIG fighter jets that were dispatched for the operation. The mission aborted. We remained in our trenches waiting for divine interventions.” “By then we had lost touch with most of what was going on around us. Save for the knowledge that we were at the front and that what was expected of us was to keep the enemy at bay, we lost count of time and were reduced to executing our duties with mechanical efficiency,” he adds.

Amin turns down Soviet help
“…The Soviet military advisors offered to help by making arrangements to deliver superior artillery pieces and other weapons that would have kept the Tanzanians so busy back home that they would be forced to abandon any ideas about executing northward military maneuvers, but the offer of assistances was turned down. According to sources that were close to Amin, the offer of assistance was at the time viewed with suspicion because of the ideological similarities between Nyerere’s socialist government and that of the Soviet Union…,” Rwehururu writes.

Rwehururu briefed the senior army officers about the devastating impact that the Katyusha had so far had on troop morale. “…I warned that unless something was done to counter the weapons, our troops would lose the fighting spirit, and fail to defend (the) country. The ground offensive was in very well advanced stages.”

According to Rwehururu, “On January 21, 1979 at ten in the night, amidst a heavy downpour, we started exchanging fire. It as difficult for the troops to distinguish the sound of small arms fire from that of Katyusha or a 160 millimeter pounder. One could only distinguish lighting would come in a zigzag manner towards the ground, the artillery fire would be moving towards the sky and then down in an arc.”

Mutukula fell to the Tanzanians in a few days who heavily relied on their artillery and the enormous size of their force. The invading force was met with some strong Uganda Army units that put up resistance in several battles. “…In Kampala, despite the news that Mutukula had fallen and that the enemy was ferociously advancing deeper into our territory, members of the army high command, including my commanding officer, were busy celebrating the eighth anniversary (January 25) of Amin’s rule,” Rwehururu recalls.

A big parade was held at Kololo air strip in Kampala where members of the Nubian community led by Lt. Col. Juma Butabika whose actions had actually sparked off the war, joined a host of others in dancing a traditional Nubian dance, the Duruku (Duluka).

“Watching the live television coverage of the national celebrations from my residence in Masaka, I realised that many of the people including senior army officers who were dancing the Duruka (Duluka) did not know what exactly was going on. All that they were being told was that the enemy was shelling Uganda with a big gun called saba saba, but they were yet to see and feel its impact,” the author adds.

Around the same time the Libyan president, Muammar Gaddafi, sent a company of some of his commandos to Uganda’s rescue, who could neither speak English nor Swahili therefore creating a communication break down. “The arrival of the Libyan desert commandos was as surprising as it was annoying because we had all along made it clear to Amin and the entire Army top brass that all we needed was artillery fire power to neutralise the enemy’s Katyusha and not the personnel…,” the author says.