Royal Suites refusal to comply is cause for suspicion - Larsen

Apt. 171, C.cu CT4A, KDT Vinh Diem Trung, Xa Vinh Hiep Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa, Vietnam
Mobile: +84-98-9607357, Fax: +49-231-292734790 , E-mail: [email protected]

To: Insurance Regulation Authority of Uganda
Plot 5 Kyadondo Road, Nakasero
Legacy Towers, Block B, 2nd Floor
Phone: +256-312-266364
+256-414-346712
Fax: +256-414-349260
E-mail: [email protected]

cc: Mr Allan Mugwanya
Mr Frank Mawejje (IIB)
Josef Buwembo (Buwembo Advocates)
Eng. Kizza (Royal Suites)
Ms Stella Okiror (c/o Christine Apio)
Mr Peter Okiror (c/o Dr Christoph H. Larsen)
via their respective e-mail addresses

05th December 2013
Re.: Insurance Claim Burns Victim Dr Christoph Heinrich LARSEN, Incident of 27th May 2012; Analysis of the “Risk Survey of Royal Suites in Relation to the Fire Outbreak on 25th April 2012”, Final Report by Multiple Consults Network Limited of 28th November 2013, Reference RS/001/13

Dear Sir or Madam,
With reference to the above, I would ike to confirm that I have today received a copy of the above final report “Risk Survey of Royal Suites in Relation to the Fire Outbreak on 25th April 2012”, and would like to take the liberty to issue a few comments as to the validity of the assumptions and statements made therein. As the format of the report I received are pictures (.jpg format), I am in no position to make comments easily, and therefore refer to the respective pages and paragraphs.

Page 01 of 22: It seems that either the client (Royal Suites Hotel’s Eng. Kizza as Managing Director) or Multiple Consult Network Ltd have not taken adequate care in processing this document, because the report seems to relate, as per the report’s heading, to an unrelated incident on 25th April 2012, and not the one, which occurred on
27th May 2012, and which is currently under scrutiny. What is more the date gets even more mixed up in the “Purpose of the Survey” section on the same page, where 25th May 2012 is clearly stated as the date of the incidents. Both dates are incongruent, and this one the same page, and seem to perspire a lack of the required diligence that should have accompanied such consulting task. Evidently, Royal Suites has not bothered to countercheck such important details, which, in turn highlights their degree of diligence in this matter.
It is further remarkable that the report is dated 28th November 2013, whereas IIB’s Frank Mawejje stated in his emails of 06th August 2013 “that there was no negligence committed”, while Buwembo Advocate’s Josef Buwembo already know even one day earlier, on 05th August 2013 that “a fire outbreak analysis report [had been] prepared by a reputable firm of risk consultants” that “found no substantive reason to suggest that our client [Royal Suites Hotel] could have been negligent in the causation, spread and any subsequent developments in relation to the subject fire outbreak [...]”. It is quite astounding that such pre-emptive wisdom had been available already in early August 2013, whereas the final report by the said risk assessor was not issued any earlier than late November 2013.

Page 02 of 22: It gets even more inconclusive on this page: The report states clearly that is was only on 06th August 2013 that a meeting was held at Royal Suites Hotel with Eng. Kizza as Managing Director, who must have corresponded with the consulting firm by an “undated letter”. Undated letters should, of course, not have any place in the given context, and therefore reveal again, an unfortunate degree of sloppiness. What is, however, most striking is the fact that Mr Josef Buwembo talks of his imaginate report on 05th August, exactly one day prior to the preparatory meeting, i.e. before Multiple Consults Network Ltd ever got actively involved. Quite evidently, this does not tally, and either the report, or Josef Buwembo must have issued misleading, if not blatantly untrue statements.
The aforesaid source and references have been provided by earlier correspondence, but can be readily resupplied, if so desired.

On the same page, paragraph 3) of ‘Purpose of the Survey” indicated that the same consulting firm has performed “an evaluation of the established Circumstances / Case of Fire outbreak at the hotel complex on 25/05/2012 since Multiple Consult had initially carried out a property assessment for M/s Chartis Insurance of Uganda. Again, the date of the incident is incorrectly stated, and it may be questionable practice to have the same consulting firm do repeat assessment, as such conduct does certainly not help in terms of transparency, neutrality and peer review.

The section “The Risk / Hazard posed by LPG” states that “[t]he suites are supplied with LPG gas [correctly: LPG, CHL] which is supplies by Shell Uganda.” It is amusing that the so-called expert consultant doing the fire risk assessment is not familiar with the proper use of LPG as abbreviation, which stands for liquified petroleum gas.
Such small lapses indicate that the author of the report reviewed here is evidently not quite on such familiar terms with the matter as client Royal Suites, and their legal representatives wish to impress.

In addition, the small gas bottle (presumably 4 kg) that was located under the sink/cooking area in the suite occupied at the time of the incident did not bear any trademark, but was of a dull green colour without any markings, and did not bear the Shell branding. This finding is in stark contrast to the report which in no uncertain terms insists upon the “fact” that this “gas is filled in a 2ton main tank from where it is supplied to the different locations of the suites.” While CHL cannot make any assumptions as to where the gas for the cooking stove came from at the time of the incident, it is absolutely clear that there was a gas bottle under the sink that was connected via a typical plastic tube to the area below the stove. Evidently, this fact has completely escaped the attention of the risk assessment consultant, which is understandable given the enormous time lapse between the incident and the site survey, and the evidently substandard levels of care taken whilst doing the latter.

Page 03 of 22: The report further states that “[a] powerful odorant (ethanethiol) [also known as ethyl mercaptan, CHL] is added so that leaks can be detected easily.” Of course, this should be the case, and that is what every hotel client does indeed expect. However, despite my medically trained rather sensitive nose that can easily pick up
the smell of ketoacidosis from my patients, I have failed to ever smell such “powerful odorant”. The same statement was given by the deceased prior to her demise, as she confirmed to her sister, Stella Okiror, that there was indeed nothing that is commonly know as “gas smell” whatsoever. This permits us to conclude that the LPG used by Royal Suites lacked the required odorant, as described in standard test procedure ASTM D5305-12, which describes LPG as a “colourless and odourless, and not detectable by human senses”1. The report continues: “The international standard is EN589.” The last sentence, as well as the preceding ones explaining the nature and composition of LPG are taken verbatim from Wikipedia2, and contain a slight inaccuracy that was equally taken over from the same source: Standard EN589 applies to the use and safety of LPG in motor vehicles, only, and does not commonly relate to LPG for domestic purposes. Again, such easily detectable errors may cast a shadow of doubt on the consulting firm’s professional capacity.

However, notwithstanding such lapses, the subsequent elaborations copied by Multiple Consults Network Ltd from Wikipedia are otherwise correct and state an important fact: LPG is, unlike mains gas, heavier than air, and therefore behaves like water. Any leaked gas will cover the floor of the apartment first, while gas levels rise – again,
like water – to fill up the apartment. It is of some relevance that the balcony door was indeed open at the time of the incident, allowing the gas to flow out onto the balcony and to dissipate into the surrounding greenery, behaving very much like a gently (and utterly invisible) water cascade.
The section “The location of the gas tank” is irrelevant, not only because it is sufficiently rare that gas containers explode, unless on violent impact in the course of a road traffic accident or due to serious overheating, but also because we are talking of the possibility of a different gas source sitting right under the kitchen surface in the form and shape of a small gas bottle without any branding, and connected to the stove underside by a plastic tube.

Page 07 of 22: A photo claims that “water hose pipes installed throughout the suites are connected to the swimming pool”. I can confirm that there are water hose pipe around, indeed. However, immediately after the incident, when I managed to emerge from the room with 24% of his skin missing, I did try to guide the hotel staff to use those water hoses. Evidently, the hotel staff was not at all trained for emergencies, but what was worse was the fact that those water hose pipes were evidently not connected to any functioning water supplies! In the end, staff tried to bring in portable fire extinguishers, which were, of course, entirely inadequate, so that the fire brigade had to be called in. However, the above scenario casts serious doubts on the hotel’s fire safety and infrastructure. The assessment by Multiple Consults Network unfortunately fails to report whether or not any of the fire fighting equipment visualised in the report has ever been tested by the consultant in order to yield more substantial results.

Page 08 of 22: The report criticises the location of the kitchen area close to the entrance, thus “pos[ing] a big risk to the guests in case of any fire outbreak”. This is not entirely correct: Whilst true for fires fed by equipment and furniture, gas explosion work entirely differently, as the gas will have dissipated across the whole room following the law of gravity. Hence, the explosion would be as bad in the sleeping area as it would be in the kitchen, provided the distribution of gas due ot the ongoing leak is not disturbed by and draft. Again: It is not exploding gas bottles that cause the damage in the such settings, but the gas outside such containers. In any case, the statement given in the report highlight again the limited experience of the hired consultant in the given domain.

Page 10 of 22: Among the damaged goods, the assessor interestingly lists a “gas cylinder”, which corroborates my above statement that other than the outside 2,000 kg tank, there was an indoor gas cylinder of unknown provenience deployed. For details see my comments pertaining to Page 02 of 10.

Page 11 of 22: It may be noteworthy to mention that the explosion was strong enough to deliver a complete knockout effect – there was no time, nor consciousness for jumping as cause of the abrasion to my left knee.

Page 12 of 22: For accuracy’s sake, kindly note that the balcony door was open throughout the evening of the incident. This, and the photograph shown, highlight the force deployed by the sudden combustion of the gas.
The bottom of the same page tries to describe the effects of decreasing temperate in relation to the distance from the kitchen as presumed centre of the explosion, where the gas wave reached the cooking flame. Unfortunately, the elaboration given is scientific gibberish. Given the physical characteristics of LPG, it behaves, as already mentioned above, like water. Ignite any point of that pool that boast a combustible gas/air mix, and the whole gas pool with blow up in its entirety and instantaneously. Unlike fire caused by solid fuels, the concept of distance from the original gas leak is completely misleading, because in a gas explosion in a contained space the “air” is on fire – everywhere. This is why the notebook computer, which was located several metres away from the kitchen on a table close to the window got as much molten as any other plastic items, such as my ABS-based hard-shell suitcase. A direction effect is, however, created by the sudden expansion of hot gases and the vacuum effect of the sudden consumption of oxygen due to the combustion (an effect that causes commonly severe airway injury in victims exposed to explosions).

Page 15 of 22: The newly restored stove displays an interesting fact, i.e. a slightly depressed cooking area, obviously designed to contain spilled food. In the case of a leakage from an inadvertantly left open burner with neighbouring gas burners burning open flames any such user-created leak would have been burnt off within several seconds. This picture therefore adds support to my scientific deduction that the leak must have originated from under the coking surface, be it the no-name gas bottle and its connection or otherwise.

Page 16 of 22: The existence of the 2,000 kg outside gas tank does not negate the presence of a non-branded gas cylinder inside the room under the kitchen surface, and is therefore of little relevance.

Page 18 of 22: Kindly refer to my comment pertaining to Page 07 of 22.

Page 19 of 22: The pictures shown here do not explain the presence of a non-branded gas cylinder inside the room, located under the kitchen surface, with plastic connections. The reported installation does not preclude tear and wear, and slow leaks from material fatigue, erroneous plumbing or slipping connections.

Page 20 of 22: Again, the consultant deploys his/her entirely unscientific serial model, stating that the area close to the leak must have burnt worst This is completely untenably in the case of gas explosions, as clearly explained in Page 12 of 22 and elsewhere throughout this document.

Page 21 of 22: The summary and conclusions by Multiple Consults Network Ltd reflect the firm’s grave errors in scientific reasoning, displaying a clear and proven lack of expertise and experience as to the nature of gaseous explosions, physics and their effects on the human body. In addition, the firm assumes an incorrect sequence of events both with regards to Mr Patrick Obbo’s role, as well as the timing of the explosion, and its triggering events.

Part 22 of 22: The flaky study by Multiple Consults Network Ltd is therefore in no way able to exclude public liability on the part of the insured. What is more, the insured has been offered adequate compensation services by AIG/Chartis (Uganda), and Royal Suites’ refusal to comply with common and proper procedures as seen everywhere else in the hospitality industry may be seen as a cause of suspicion and concern.
It was also noted that during the meeting with Buwembo Advocates and IIB’s Frank Mawejje on 03rd December 2013, the victim’s representatives were pushed to accept the contents of the nonsense report provided in order to be allowed to enter any compensation negotiations. This kind of bullying is, of course, entirely unacceptable and underlines the highly unprofessional nature of Royal Suites’, IIB’s and Buwembo Advocates’ conduct. I am happy to provide any further evidence as required, including copies of mail correspondence, etc.
Thank you and best regards
(signed electronically)

PAGE 09 0f 22:

In “Recommendations to mitigate possible exposures” things get worse, and the complete lack of the consultant’s gas engineering expertise is cruelly revealed: It is not the automatic ignition circuit that renders a previously manually lit burner safe, but the installation of a flame sensor inside the burner. Such sensors interrupt automatically (either electronically, or in the Ugandan context, preferably via thermo-coupling) the flow of gas, if there is no flame in the burner area, which is equivalent to a gas leak due operator error. When I arrived at the Royal Suites Hotel I was immediately aware of the serious safety flaw with their burners, as there was no such flame sensor, and extra care was taken throughout (which includes the evening of the incident) to keep a careful eye on the gas valves and the burners alike.
The paragraph “Background information” is peppered with incorrect statements. Not only is the date of the incident stated incorrectly, but it the scenario of “[a] Ugandan helper Mr. Obbo Patrick, an employee of M/s Royal Suites Ltd who rushed at the scene following the explosion to assist” and “was seriously injured by the fire” is grossly incorrect. The true circumstances were somewhat different, and underline the physical characteristics of LPG: My guest, Ms Christine Apio and myself were cooking together, as I had the former over for dinner, with pots on the gas burners and happily simmering. As I was in a sitting position just shortly before the explosion, I could clearly see the open gas flames from the burners working correctly. As mentioned before, we were both painfully ware of the hazardous nature of the stoves provided by Royal Suites, as they failed to feature flame sensors, and therefore carefully., and repeatedly, checked all gas valves.
Then, the laundry boy, Mr Patrick Obbo, knocked at the door to return the clean laundry. He opened the door, and entered, while I got my wallet out to pay him directly in accordance with prevailing hotel policy. Then – the explosion must have happened, as I woke up after an undeterminable period, several metres inside the room, thrown there by the force of the explosion. However, the mechanism that triggered the explosion is interesting and revealing, and has been reiterated repeatedly in previous correspondence, only to be ignored by seemingly less scientifically versed representatives of Royal Suites.

As the room must have filled up with heavier-than-air LPG that lacked the ethanethiol additive required by law, the opening of the entrance door by Mr Patrick Obbo must necessarily have caused waves like seen in a swimming pool or similar. Such wave of highly combustible LPG/air mix must therefore have reached the open cooking flames under the cooking pots, ignited and caused a sudden, overwhelming explosion that involved all the gas in the room in an instant chemical reaction. Hence, Mr Patrick Obbo happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong tie, but did not sustain his injuries in an effort to administer assistance.