Can Museveni be defeated in election?

What you need to know:

  • Big challenge. But we need to recall Joseph Stalin’s enduring wisdom: It is not important who casts as who counts the vote.

This issue is a double-edged sword. To accept that one can fairly compete against Mr Yoweri Museveni in an election and squarely defeat him has at least two implications: First, it means legitimising the process that otherwise is riddled with illegalities and dotted with unfairness. Second, it means those participating in the process must be ready to accept the final outcome – whichever way the results go.
On the other hand, taking the view that he can’t be defeated means there is no faith in the electoral route, so a presidential election becomes meaningless, in which case citizens should not bother participating. What then is the alternative? If there is no alternative, it means many Ugandans opposed to Museveni, and his decadent rule, but who are told that he cannot be defeated in an election, will stay away from the polls. It means low voter turnout, which hands the man easy victory.

Former journalist, now businessman and power-broker, Andrew Mwenda, has vigorously advanced this line of reasoning. Mwenda makes an interesting point: That Museveni is actually supported, and elected, by a minority of Ugandans – about 40 per cent or so. This, of course, presupposes that the results announced by the Electoral Commission are genuine and accurate. I doubt that they are. Mwenda’s advice to Museveni’s opponents is this: Organise and mobilise a very high voter turnout that overwhelms the incumbent even if he were to attempt rigging the election. This view is shared by former FDC president Mugisha Muntu.

Relatedly, Mwenda points out that Museveni’s opponents need to do something else in addition to getting the vote out on polling day: They must have a presence at most if not all polling stations countrywide. After the 2016 polls, the FDC claimed it was very sure its candidate, Dr Kizza Besigye, had won the vote. How did they know? They had evidence of the results from declaration forms collected from party polling agents across the country.

Critics argued that the FDC, in fact, had no such evidence because it had agents only in a minority of the polling stations. This might be difficult to verify, but we know at a minimum that the FDC fielded parliamentary candidates in only about 45 per cent of the more than 400 constituencies countrywide. The party did even worse for local council seats. This suggests an absence of local vested-interest in protecting the vote and proofing against rigging that would come from party candidates for MP and local councils.

There is a strong case to be made for solid organising and robust mobilisation that would make possible electoral triumph against Mr Museveni. But we need to recall Joseph Stalin’s enduring wisdom: It is not important who casts as who counts the vote.
Without an independent and credible election management body, professional and neutral police and security agencies, it is impossible to imagine an election outcome that goes against an entrenched incumbent, especially one rooted in use of force and finance – coercion and bribery.

Comparative evidence shows that long-surviving incumbent parties in Africa lose power for the most part when the incumbent ruler is not on the ballot – that is why presidential term limits are critical.
There are openings when the incumbent is not on the ballot that can upstage the status quo. These include divisions and fallouts over succession, which advantage the Opposition, renewed voter enthusiasm and the fact that the chosen successor may not be fully in charge as to influence the election outcome the same way the incumbent ruler would.

Without an independent and competent election management body – the Electoral Commission – and if the police and security agencies are so partisan as to be predisposed to aiding the incumbent rig his way to remaining in power, what should the Opposition and the wider public do? Boycotting elections is not an option. Taking part in the election and mobilising the public to believe they can effect change through the electoral process is the right strategy.
But it requires that the Opposition marshals a countrywide presence and is able to build a polling-day infrastructure at most, if not all, polling stations, especially those where rigging is most likely.

This has to start with fielding candidates at parliamentary and lower levels. Only then is it possible at the end to demand that the electoral commission announces the right results because the opposition can produce evidence that contradicts the rigged/official results.
With overwhelming evidence of rigging and with robust grassroots mobilisation, possibility of civic resistance against a fraudulent election outcome is real. Museveni would then be cornered, inevitably resorting to the military option, which in the final analysis is his real source of power. Once matters get to that point, anything is possible.