Uganda: President Museveni and the political market place

Uganda’s politics of deal-making has shifted in quite significant ways, from principled engagement to personal transactions.

If in the past political deal-making used to be about group-interests, it is now about individual aggrandisement.

The terrain of engagement has changed, the calibre of actors is decidedly different and the modus operandi for striking deals has dramatically shifted. There have been major phases and stages since 1986.

To break these down is an important exercise, especially for anyone arrived in Uganda today, or those Ugandans that may not know the country’s politics beyond the past 10 years.

Retracing the phases helps put in perspective the current ‘new normal,’ of parading at State House or at the presidential farm in Kisozi self-appointed representatives of the ghetto and neophytes, who supposedly have a following in the underworld of social media.

After he captured power in 1986 via the force of the gun, Mr Museveni needed to secure the support of the extant political establishment, primarily the two major political parties, the recently overthrown UPC, and DP, Mr Museveni also needed on his side powerful socio-cultural constituencies such as the churches, the Muslim community and the Kingdom of Buganda. All these and others had representation in the governance system dubbed the ‘Movement.’

The deal-making of the early years was largely informal, but constructive. It involved access to power and resources but with less avarice. Certain principles, including the public good and the cause of national transformation, drove the deliberations and the spirit of engagement.

On the heels of these political negotiations and compromises that started in earnest in 1986, was the proliferation of armed rebel activities.
For Museveni, the military man, the default response to armed rebellion was to take war to the rebels.

This strategy succeeded in some instances, it failed in many others. War took a heavy toll on a country that had already been devastated by Museveni’s own war for power in Luweero. Some of the rebellions were extinguished through deals that involved payouts and the grant of access to trappings of military and State power.

The sharing of power with established political parties or at least leaders in those parties, the restoration of traditional institutions such as the Kingdom of Buganda, the negotiations and compromises with armed groups, the granting of concessions to religious institutions; all were critical for State-building and social stability in a country fraught with disharmony and fragility.

The 1995 Constitution granted guarantees and institutionalised some of these major reforms. For the many Ugandans who believed in political pluralism, the return to multiparty politics in 2005 was a most welcome development.

It was negotiated and concluded in a fairly constructive set of processes. At that time, Mr Museveni was on record saying he was compelled by external donors and the need to get rid of internal opposition in agreeing to accede a return to party politics.

This highpoint in the struggle for democracy in Uganda – the return to multiparty politics – also proved to be the poisoned turning point leading to the vulgar political market place we see today.

As the country transitioned to a new political system, arguably, for the first time there was open introduction of blatant bribery in the form of paying Members of Parliament to amend the Constitution so that Mr Museveni would continue ruling in what has now become a de facto life-presidency. That precedent of paying MPs became conspicuous.

Since then, we embarked on an inexorable slide to the bottom with principles thrown to the wind and the pursuit of personal material interests taking precedent over public causes. On his part, the imperatives of sustaining a life-presidency have made Mr Museveni ever desperate to scatter any semblance of formidable opposition to his rule.

The events of the last two years, with the rise of the ‘Bobi Wine phenomenon’ fuelled by the unmatched power of music and the youth boom, have only accelerated the stakes.

Add to that the role of many hangers-on and schemers, in Parliament, in the media, in the entertainment industry and in business circles. They line-up to broker deals involving defectors so they can extract some rent from the ruler.

Khisa is assistant professor at North Carolina State University (USA).
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