How the Bush War was planned, started

PART I:

PART II:

A brief encounter with Museveni in exile, and return to Amin’s Uganda

Museveni saw the rise of Amin as a legitimate reason to organise to free Uganda

The launch of the Bush War as is to be expected was a clandestine affair. It was planned and executed by Museveni and his close security operatives, and only those who needed to know.
In January 1981, after we lost the elections, I was in touch with Museveni a couple of times, mainly to link him with personalities who wanted to establish a political relationship with him and the Third Force.
One of these was Balaki Kirya, my close colleague and long-term collaborator. Sometime in January 1981, Museveni approached me to help locate a suitable place to continue his Bush War preparations. At that time, Museveni was living in John Kazoora’s house in Makindye, not far from my own home, also in Makindye.
After secret consultations, including with my wife Sheba, we agreed to prepare our house as an assembly point for the strike force. Because of the “need to know” rule, apart from Museveni, only the late Sam Magara and Elly Tumwine would have been privy to where that target was going to be – not even members of the strike force.
Providing a base for the rebels was an act of treason and I did not want my family involved in any way; on top of that, we obviously did not want anyone not involved in the operation, including family, to know what was going on.
So, the day after the arrival of the first batch of rebels at our home, I arranged to evacuate my wife and children, the youngest being Rose and Enid, then four years old.
By various and tenuous routes, they all ended up in Nairobi, where I had maintained a house. I remained alone at my home in Makindye with my trusted driver, Eric Byomuhangi.
Byomuhangi had been with me during the UPM campaigns in Rukungiri, and was under strict instructions not to leave the premises lest he breathe a word to anyone. I also locked up the house telephone so that neither him nor any of the fighters could use it for any contacts.
The fighters arrived at my house in twos and threes over the next three days and were shown where they would stay. These men were coming from other homes, which served as transit centres before coming to my home in Makindye. Some of these homes included Elly Karuhanga’s and Elly Rwakakooko’s.
At my home, one room was reserved for Museveni, who stayed for only one night. Sam Magara, who was deputising Museveni, came only to drop the fighters but never stayed overnight.
The resident leader was Elly Tumwine. The list of the fighters, when fully assembled, were: Paul Kagame, Fred Mwesigye, Elly Tumwine, Andrew Lutaaya, George Mwesigwa, Jack Mucunguzi, Julius Chihanda, Charles Tusiime Rutarago, Fred Rwigyema, Arthur Kasasira, Nathan Mwenemuzei, David Ndayondi, Robert Kabuura, Lauben Ikondere, Paul Kagina, Shaban Kashanku, Enoch Mondo, Frank Kifuba, Aziz Bey, Maurice Katungi, Muley Muwanga, Akanga Byaruhanga, Hannington Mugabi, Sam Magara and, of course, Yoweri Museveni. Several of these men arrived at my house on the day of departure.
One notable incident happened on the first night that caused us serious concern, especially because my family was still in the house. I had transformed my lock-up double garage into a small armoury, where guns were being cleaned and assembled.
On that first occasion, a bullet went off in the garage. In our neighbourhood, there were people who were opponents of Museveni and our group, and we worried that some of them might have heard it and alerted the authorities.
As it turned out, nothing happened and extra precautions were taken to avoid a repeat of the incident. On the night that Museveni slept at the house before the fateful departure for Kabamba, I had a little chat with him alone.
I revealed to him that I had an AK-47 rifle, which I had bought on the black market, for my defence, like many others were doing in the most insecure environment Ugandans were living in.
I handed the weapon to him, knowing it would now be more useful to him than to me in the circumstances. I also had a pistol, which I now gave to Andrew Lutaaya, who was the driver of the truck carrying the attack force heading for Kabamba. Even as we talked about it, and without saying so, it was evident that at the back of our minds there was an off chance possibility we might not see each other again.
Meanwhile, Lutaaya had secured a covered Mercedez Benz truck, which was now parked in the compound. I had obtained food provisions such as posho, beans, matooke and even meat, for the group who, with the help of my driver Eric, were cooking for themselves.
In spite of the large number of people in the house, absolute silence was maintained, and it would have been difficult for anybody who was not in the know to tell that the house was occupied.
Departure was on February 5, late in the afternoon, when the order was given by Tumwine for everybody to board the truck, whose engine was already running.
Within two or three minutes, the vehicle, driven by Lutaaya, was out of my gate and soon lost in the city traffic, headed for the first target. About an hour later, Museveni turned up at the house, accompanied by Magara, to check that all was well.
I must commend Tumwine, because when it was time to leave, he spent about 10 minutes cleaning up the place to remove any trace of the group’s presence – this included several empty bottles of nerve-steadying Uganda Waragi, which the rebels consumed within the final 20 minutes before departure; they too were only human!
I was now on my own with Byomuhangi and trying to figure out what next for myself. Within a day, or even hours, the attack on the target was going to happen.
Obote’s security agencies would want to know everything about the operation, including where the strike force had been launched.
There was, therefore, a possibility that they could trace it back to my house. As such, I needed to clean up some more, lock up the house and lie low somewhere in Kampala to follow the events as they unfolded.
Museveni’s group struck Kabamba Military Training School at dawn on February 6, 1981.
The operation aborted, but the fighters re-grouped to continue the campaign. Somehow, in a day or two, a few of us, including Eriya Kategaya, Bakulu Mpagi, Kirunda Kivejinja and others, managed to find each other to review events. The attack on Kabamba was already in the news. At that meeting, I gave them a briefing, leaving out a few things that might have jeopardised my security.
At the next such meeting, two messages were received – one via Mpagi and the second via Andrew Lutaaya, who had returned to Kampala to undertake some errands. The message via Mpagi was for us to tell the world that an armed struggle had started to rid Uganda of Obote’s dictatorship.

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Modest, reserved and principled

His CV may be quite impressive, but Matthew Rukikaire is a modest man- perhaps the most modest “big” person you will ever meet. He was the first non-Muganda Head Boy of King’s College Budo in 1960.

The second was to me, personally, requesting me to go to Nairobi and organise our supporters and continue propagating the cause of the struggle that had just begun. I lingered around Kampala for a while, perhaps a fortnight, sleeping in different places each night, until I was able to sneak out to Nairobi.
My old schoolmate and friend, Dr William Nganwa, was one of those who hid me and helped me to leave the country undetected. While I did not get to associate closely with all 27 young men in the short time they sheltered at my home in Makindye, a few were already known to me because they were my wife’s relatives – for example, Kasasira, Ndayondi, Magara, and Lutaaya who had married my wife’s younger sister Victoria. I later had an opportunity to get to know a few others a little more closely through my work with the External Committee.

The External Committee
Upon my arrival in Nairobi in mid February 1981, I found the city abuzz with talk of the launch of the war in Uganda. The principal operator who was already in Nairobi on a Museveni mission was Sam Katabarwa, a member of Fronasa and a trusted colleague of his. We spent time together, briefing each other and planning how to set up a Popular Resistance Army (PRA) external support organisation.
There were many other Ugandans in Nairobi, but those most closely associated with the group were George Magezi, Charles Katungi, John Bagaire, and Christopher Mboijana; I believe Joshua Mugyenyi and Janet Museveni had arrived in Nairobi either just before or at the same time as I did.
Mzee Samson Kisekka was also already in Nairobi running a pharmacy. Kenya was already home to hundreds, if not thousands of Ugandans, some just recently arrived and others having lived there for years. I can think of individuals like Amos Nzeyi, Tom Kato, Prince Mulondo, Prof Kanyerezi, Tom Mboijana, Andrew Tendo, Sam Rutega, James Tumusiime and others.
My preliminary thoughts, and proposal, were that we should set up an External Committee headed by George Magezi, the oldest and most well known Ugandan supporter of the cause based in Nairobi. But Magezi and the others would not have any of that and insisted that, because of the role I was already playing, I should head the taskforce.
Shortly after that, and because of deteriorating conditions in Uganda, other UPM members continued to arrive in Nairobi, among them Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, Amama Mbabazi, Dr Crispus Kiyonga and Sam Njuba; as soon as enough committed supporters of the war were available in Nairobi, a proper External Committee was reconstituted, still headed by myself as chairman, with Joshua Mugyenyi as secretary.
I will not attempt to name all the people who sat on the External Committee as it evolved through the years, because I cannot even recall the composition; every two or three months, there were changes as people relocated abroad – to Canada, Scandinavia, USA, Southern Africa, Papua New Guinea, etc. – and were replaced by others.
I can say confidently, however, that I was the only person who sat on the Committee from the beginning of the war in 1981 until 1986 when it ended. I will attempt to list, here, some of those who served on the External Committee, or from whom the External Committee was selected – they are listed in random order as: Joshua Mugyenyi, Sam Kalega Njuba, Amama Mbabazi, Ruhakana Rugunda, Sam Katabarwa, Shem Bagaine, Bakulu Mpagi, Kirunda Kivejinja, Sam Male, Ernest Kakwano, Dr Crispus Kiyonga, Elly Rwakakooko, Suleiman Kiggundu, James Tumusiime, Jack Luyombya, Hope Kivengere, John Nasasira, Andrew Lutaaya, Eriya Kategaya, Jotham Tumwesigye, Gertrude Njuba, John Bageire, Gwennie Kategaya, Jolly Sabune, Chris Mboijana, Amos Nzeyi, Aston Kajara, Paul Kagina Mutashwera, Michael Shalita, Evelyn Nyakato, Ben Matogo, Ambassador Tomusange, Joan Kakwenzire, Tom Mboijana, Joan Kategaya, myself and many others.

Then there were NRM members in the Diaspora, including Kenya, who constituted themselves into NRM branches. A random list includes Dr Kazigo – Washington; Perez Kamunanwire – New York; John Nasasira, Kamugira, Silvanus Kataama – Kenya; Philip Kamugungunu – Boston; William Kalema, Arthur Bugari - California; Ernest Rusiita, George Kanyeihamba, Dr Mwanje – London; Edith Sempala, Ibrahim Mukiibi – Scandinavia; Patrick Kakwenzire; Elly Karuhanga, Prince John Barigye - Southern Africa; Dr William Muhairwe - Germany, and others.
John Nasasira ran a silent cell in Mumias, western Kenya, which acted as a transit point for NRM operatives. Later, he moved to Nairobi where he chaired another branch and accommodated several operatives.
The PRA in the bush, apart from its principal task of executing the war, was anxious to create an organisational framework to give the armed struggle political backing and legitimacy, and also to have a civilian wing.
Thus, a civilian committee headed by Moses Kigongo was created in the bush as a parallel body to PRA’s High Command headed by Museveni. Other committees were also formed as follows: Political and Diplomatic, headed by Kategaya; Information and Propaganda, headed by Bakulu Mpagi Wamala; External Committee, which I headed. These seven now constituted an Executive Committee, which was the supreme governing body of the PRA.
The second task was to broaden the political front; Museveni was keen to link up and, if possible, unite or merge with other organisations opposed to Obote’s government.
The obvious organisations to look out for were Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) of Andrew Kayiira, also formed in 1981; the other was Yusuf Lule’s Uganda Freedom Front (UFF), which had a smattering of fighters in Uganda.
Lule had actually been with Kayiira but had broken away in disagreement to form his own UFF in Nairobi. The talks took place in Nairobi, at my home; I led, and spoke for the PRA side, while Grace Ibingira spoke for UFM. I put forward the case for a merger, while Ibingira argued for a loose co- operation.
Lule was not at the talks, but had made his position on acceptance of a merger with PRA clear. So, while talks with UFM ended inconclusively, within days, now with Lule around, a document of a merger between PRA and UFF was concluded and signed.
Museveni had arrived in Nairobi and both he and Lule appended their signatures. In June 1981, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) was born, with Prof Lule as chairman and Museveni as vice chairman. The other organs of PRA were to be re-organised to accommodate UFF, and I was to remain chairman of the External Committee of the new NRM.

An arms consignment from Gaddafi

The principal role of the reconstituted NRM outside Uganda was twofold: to popularise NRM around the world and to mobilise resources, particularly arms, for the war effort.
The merger gave a big boost to the task of popularising NRM, because the political base had, overnight, been expanded beyond our wildest expectations.
Baganda in the Diaspora started declaring their support for NRM and started forming NRM branches and contributing financially. The first breakthrough in the hunt for arms came shortly thereafter.
Through a contact made by Sam Male at the Libyan Bank in Kampala, Libya had indicated their readiness to support Museveni’s war effort.
They were also supplying arms to UFM, but had heard about the launch of a new front of PRA and been told of its revolutionary character.
So, further discussions were held through the Libyan Embassy in Nairobi and arrangements made for an NRM delegation to travel to Tripoli to see Muammar Gaddafi. The delegation that travelled to Tripoli was made up of Museveni, Rugunda, Njuba and I.
We met Gaddafi in June 1981 and presented our request for arms. Knowing that Museveni’s UNLA, together with the Tanzania Peoples Defence Force had earlier defeated Amin, who was heavily supported by Libyan soldiers, Museveni was at pains to explain to Gaddafi the villain that Amin was and why his removal had not been against Islam.
But the main reason that Gaddafi felt bound to support NRM was because he became convinced that Museveni and his organisation were African revolutionaries and, if successful, could become his allies in his search for African unity under his leadership.
So he made a commitment, although he did not provide details of how and when the arms would be forthcoming. After Tripoli, our group detoured through London to brief Prof Lule, and to meet other Ugandans there, like Mwanje, Ernest Rusiita, Ben Matogo, Princess Bagaya and others, before returning to Nairobi.
Within two weeks of our Tripoli trip, we received communication from Libya that a consignment of arms had been delivered to Bujumbura, Burundi.
Several regime changes have taken place in Burundi since then, so the secrecy of that operation is no longer important.
I say this because the arms consignment came into Bujumbura without the knowledge of the Government there. After discussing the issue, Museveni, Katabarwa and I agreed that I should travel to Bujumbura to arrange for the delivery of the consignment through Rwanda to Uganda.
The logistics of carrying out this operation were left to me to work out. I contacted my trusted friend, Girigori Karuletwa, a Ugandan transporter of petroleum products to Rwanda and Burundi.
My own vehicles were a risk because they were already blacklisted by Obote’s government. We agreed that the consignment of arms should be transported from Bujumbura via Rwanda to Uganda in one of his empty petroleum tankers returning to Mombasa.
He identified the tanker and both of us caught a plane to Bujumbura. I have rarely seen or handled such a smooth operation.
When we got to Bujumbura, the tanker had already off-loaded its cargo and was waiting. Kaluretwa had already briefed his driver and the return cargo was discreetly loaded into the tanker where it was hidden, and the tanker set off for its return journey.
I parted company with Karuletwa, flew to Kigali and saw the tanker transit through Rwanda, headed for the Rwanda-Uganda border. I briefed Museveni, who was still in Nairobi, on the progress by phone, and then caught a plane from Kigali back to Nairobi.
When I arrived in Nairobi, I found Museveni in an exuberant mood. He had received communication from his brother, Salim Saleh, that the arms had arrived in Uganda, been off-loaded and were on their way to the bush.
Museveni ordered a bottle of champagne, which we – himself, Sam Katabarwa and I – drank in celebration.
Soon after, Museveni was headed for the bush, having accomplished the formation of NRM and secured the first consignment of arms for the Bush War.
Indeed, the bulletins coming from the bush suggested that with the new hardware, the bush offensive against Obote had been stepped up.