Rich, poor in Uganda: Who do the gods favour? (Part II)

Last week, we noted that President Yoweri Museveni has come a very long way, from privileging a “peasant army” and the masses/people as the foundation of the country’s success, to now arguing that the children of the rich will be its saviour.

 We didn’t stumble to the place where we are today. Before the latest plutocratic/oligarchic ideology, Museveni and NRM’s rule had gone through three phases. Each of them, except the first one, lasted nearly 10 years.

 The first, immediately after the NRM came to power in January 1986, was rule by the liberators, the heroes who fought the bush war. The comrades. This was actually an exciting period, and the foundation for the progress that Uganda made, such as it is, was laid in the eight years between 1988 and the end of 1997.

 The three most consequential reforms, whatever their pitfalls, happened in Finance under Crispus Kiyonga (free exchange rates and economic liberalisation); in Cooperatives ( in the local commodities market); under Bidandi Ssali in Labour (he freed NSSF to be what it is today) and Energy (ended state monopoly on the fuel market); in Local government (under Bidandi and Amanya Mushega); and in education (under Mushega). At the bureaucratic level it happened in ministry of Finance led by now central bank governor Tumusiime Mutebile, which had embarrassing riches of talented people. 

 It was, relatively, a good period for NRM and the liberators and their allies, providing the best crop of leaders of  Museveni’s rule so far. On the flipside, it was an exclusive a club, and not very representative of Uganda. Before long they were being mocked as the “for us”, “we fought” crowd, some also referred to as NRM “historicals”. They were further undermined by the continued brutal wars in northeast and northern Uganda, and discredited by corruption, leading to derisive commentary about the “Twarire” (We have eaten) people.

 They had run the reform gauntlet, and with the 1995 Constitution passed, there was little more they could do. The 1996 election necessitated Museveni to expand his base beyond the southwest, and spelt the beginning of end of the comrades. Unable to fashion an imaginative vision for his election and expansion into the East and North, Museveni’s rule became based further on patronage.

 So, the end of the comrades phase, ushered in a full-throated embrace of “NRM cadres”. Cadres could be drawn beyond the people who fought in the southwestern bushes, and were filtered through ideological schools, mainly Kyankwanzi, or service in the Uganda People’s Defence Forces.  But it also marked a large recruitment into government of the children of the comrades and bush fighters who had come of age. 

 The outcome was mixed at best. There were two splits in the NRM. The first remained internal, driven by differences in outlook over the prosecution of the war in the north, democratisation, corruption, increasing nepotism, and the DR Congo war. It produced a divide between the moderates/progressives (Eriya Kategaya, James Wapakhabulo, Gen Mugisha Muntu, etc) and the hardliners (by far the majority). The dams burst towards the end of 2000 when Col Kizza Besigye dramatically broke ranks, and went on to challenge Museveni in the March 12, 2001, presidential election.

 By 2011, we were into the third phase, with Museveni publicly arguing that the “Balokole” (Born Again Christians) would be the saviours, and the people he would rely on. State House, and especially First Lady Janet Museveni, was the unofficial leader of the Born Again movement in the country. Shrewd enough to maintain the balance of power, she would occasionally signal that Museveni was the keeper, by saying he was God’s gift to Uganda.

 This God’s army was channelled into Museveni’s legacy projects, including the standard gauge railway, and into the Special Forces Command (SFC), Uganda’s Praetorian Guard and presidential protection unit. This godly contingent didn’t fare much better than the cadres, expect in SFC where, admittedly, there have been a few brilliant offshoots who have been funnelled into public service.

 They were additionally disrupted by a new crop of pastors who fell outside the spiritual authority of State House  like Joseph Kabuleta (who was presidential candidate in the recent election) and the flamboyant prophet Elvis Mbonye. 

 A reset was necessary. As we close on Museveni’s fourth decade, beyond the unfortunate choice of the words “children of the rich”, effectively he is seeking to reorganise the State around the children of the cadres and national elite, especially those who came from the post-1996 expansion.

 There are 100 ways this will fail, but at least like he has done the previous three occasions, he has been very public about it. 

Mr Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. 

Twitter: @cobbo3