If you plan to rule from the grave you must make deals while still alive

Author: Daniel K Kalinaki. PHOTO/FILE. 

What you need to know:

  •  DP and Ssemogerere, on the other hand, had been robbed of the 1980 election and had gone into Parliament as the official opposition. Although it had suffered attrition to UPC in Parliament, it still had the legitimacy, the structures and the personnel to help form a government. NRA had the hardware, DP the software.

When Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere met in Nabingo on the outskirts of Kampala in January 1986 each had something the other needed. Museveni and the NRA were on the verge of capturing power after a five-year guerrilla war, but they lacked the political structures through which to manage it.

DP and Ssemogerere, on the other hand, had been robbed of the 1980 election and had gone into Parliament as the official opposition. Although it had suffered attrition to UPC in Parliament, it still had the legitimacy, the structures and the personnel to help form a government. NRA had the hardware, DP the software.

Many DP officials, including Ssemogerere, Joseph Mulenga, Sebana Kizito, Robert Kitariko were appointed to the government as a result of those discussions. In fact, with only a few notable exceptions like Kizza Besigye, Amanya Mushega and Kahinda Otafiire, the military wing was kept out of Cabinet. Yet space was found, even for military rivals like Moses Ali and Andrew Kayiira.

 The first Cabinet was therefore a government of national unity. It also had possibly the highest number of scientists and medical professionals, including Samson Kisekka, Ruhakana Rugunda, James Batwala, Alex Ofumbi, Sheme Masaba Chemangey, Crispus Kiyonga, as well as technocrats like Victoria Sekitoleko, Ibrahim Mukiibi and others. 

 A country that had suffered civil war and political instability for the previous 20 years now had a broad-based government and some of its best brains in Cabinet. It seemed too good to be true and, with time, this became evident.

 If the agreement reached between the NRA and DP in Nabingo was documented, it has never been made public. It is thus difficult to understand who was responsible for what, how the roles would be monitored, and how lapses would be adjudicated or punished.

 History now shows that the NRA/M negotiated in poetry, it governed in prose. Within months it was clear that real power would remain in the NRA, and that even as political pluralism was disallowed, there would be favouritism and the selection of winners within the Big Church.

 The secretive nature of the political settlement meant that it was impossible to tell, at least from the outside, when different parties did not do as agreed. It isn’t clear how involved the wider DP officials were in the negotiation although rank and file members who had voted for the party only five years earlier, were certainly kept out of the loop.

 As soon as the NRA/M had laid down political roots, first with the extension of its term in 1989, and then with the loaded dice of the Constituent Assembly elections and process, it discarded its political allies. Today the NRA/M enjoys a super majority in Parliament and almost uncontested control over the levers of the state. What, then, is the reason for the recent alliance with the Norbert Mao rump of the DP which, with nine, has even fewer MPs than UPC?

First is Mao himself. Museveni and the NRM have, over the past 15 years pulled off the most cunning political pivot and harvested the political peace dividend from the end of the LRA war in northern Uganda. The entry of the Acholi political elite into top NRA/M and government structures has delivered, in exchange, an electoral turnaround in the north that has covered up losses in the east and central parts of the country. Mao was the last, but not least. 

 NRM’s earlier alliance with the UPC created a model in which the leaders of opposition parties can join the government without losing the party credentials that allow them to run as opposition candidates. Tied to punitive budgetary allocations to areas that vote against the ruling party, this increases the incentives for voters to join the Big Church.

DP might have lost many of its officials and voters to the NUP, but it retains pedigree and brand cachet. An alliance with the NRM removes another pillar that the opposition could have banded together to build a super alliance against the ruling party.  Daniel arap Moi’s impending departure in Kenya allowed the opposition to build the NARC super alliance that swept KANU out of power and keeps it out to this day.

 By tying up the small parties, Museveni is reducing the number of serious challengers he has to worry about. More importantly, he is also helping whoever succeeds him in NRM to stay in power when he is eventually gone. As usual, it is the long game for the son of Kaguta. Those who intend to rule from the grave need to make deals while they are still alive.

Mr Kalinaki is a journalist and  poor man’s freedom fighter.

[email protected]; @Kalinaki