Author: Asuman Bisiika. PHOTO/FILE
The biggest challenge in contemporary states is the management of intelligence services. They are in exclusive custodian of vast information resources about institutions and individuals (international and municipal) Management and release of privileged information is made to advantage state interests. Challenge is: what if the intelligence services use information in their exclusive custody to advantage an individual or an agenda?
Many Ugandans may remember an incident in which our boys (ISO or ESO?) raided the Sudanese Embassy in Kampala. They were embarrassed to find none of the guns they had accused the Sudanese diplomats of possessing.
The recent NAI (Nairobi Abduction Incident) is disturbing. Which agency carried it out? Was it ESO or Defence Intelligence (former CMI). Is it wise to allow Defence Intelligence (DI) such latitude and attitude? To sign off an operation, superiors will always ask: Have you considered the political fallout? And the political fallout from the NAI is what we are experiencing now. Did those responsible (or their superiors) consider the potential political fall-out from the incident? Did they consider that the Judiciary, Chief Justice and Courts of Judicature would be exposed?
Did they consider that the Government of Kenya would be exposed too?How did Uganda bring Jamil Mukulu before justice in Uganda? Was it necessary to ‘take justice to him’ (in Tanzania)? Although Mr Museveni is the ultimate consumer of intelligence, he doesn't run intelligence services. He is President, Head of State and Alternate State. His is to trust that the people he appoints to run intelligence services are good enough to do a good job.
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Mossad Uliya Bet (popularly known as Mossad) attracted world attention when they conducted an operation to abduct Adolf Eichmann from Argentina. Adolf Eichmann was a notorious Nazi who had taken on a new identity in Argentina.
The brazenness of the operation to abduct Eichmann raised eyebrows world over. Some intelligence analysts say this act alone alienated Israel from other countries. With three other sensational operations, prime minister Ben Gurion had to act: he fired Mossad director Isser Harel and replaced him with Meir Amit, Amit reviewed Mossad operational conduct and re-directed Mossad to security enhancing intelligence. No drama, no more politics, no more search and rescue, no more kidnappings, no more agenda other than the security of Israel.
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In whose interest was the NAI? Wasn’t there any other way to conduct it other than what was done? Does the government like the exposure the Supreme Court and Chief Justice is experiencing (just because some clever guys did manyanga in Nairobi?). Under Danny Yatom, Mossad suffered reputation issues (and with it, Israel). Under Danny’s direction, Mossad conducted dramatic operations which cost Israel a lot diplomatically and financially. The operation to inject an Arab leader with poison in Beirut was such a sub-optimal operation.
Under pressure from the international community, Israel was forced to produce the antidote. This was embarrassing to Netanyahu. Yatom was an IDF General, who hadn't risen through Mossad ranks. His primary motivation was to please Netanyahu, with whom he had served in Sayeret Matkal. He ended up being fired by Netanyahu, whose political career was on the line. In fact, he was later to lose the next election to Ehud Barack, another Sayeret Matkal and IDF man.
Yatom didn't build long cases, a strategy that would have afforded Israel the benefit to strike at the time of their choosing when it made more security and political mileage. They did it against Hezebollah recently by exploding their beepers. Lengthy foxy hunts may lead to many opposition agents into double spies with the potential to lead to "intelligence gold mines."
The writer, Asuman Bisiika, is the former director of the East African Flag Post.
