The six killer diseases of (Opposition) coalitions - Part II

Norbert Mao

What you need to know:

  • In this sequel, I will delve into concrete cases. To ground our case studies properly, we start with the alliance that the Kingdom of Buganda made with the British imperial forces. By allying with Frederick Lugard, the rulers of Buganda expected to contain and push back Bunyoro-Kitara’s sub-imperialism. The maxim guns of Lugard were turned on Omukama Kabalega’s forces and the threats from Bunyoro were stemmed. 

Last week, I outlined the major ailments that afflict attempts to build coalitions in Uganda. I called them the six killer diseases responsible for the high infant mortality rate of Opposition coalitions.

In this sequel, I will delve into concrete cases. To ground our case studies properly, we start with the alliance that the Kingdom of Buganda made with the British imperial forces. By allying with Frederick Lugard, the rulers of Buganda expected to contain and push back Bunyoro-Kitara’s sub-imperialism. The maxim guns of Lugard were turned on Omukama Kabalega’s forces and the threats from Bunyoro were stemmed. 

But soon the Anglo-Ganda alliance turned out to be another ploy to divide the natives and advance Britain’s imperial interests. The treachery received a quick response from Kabaka Mwanga who realised that the contradictions between Buganda and Bunyoro were secondary contradictions. The primary contradictions was between the native people and the imperialist actions of Britain. Alas it was too late. The two powerful precolonial states had weakened each other considerably in their wars. The two kings were quickly subdued.

In the run up to Independence, Democratic Party (DP) as the party of government advocated for universal suffrage nationwide. This made it clash with the entrenched feudal interests in Buganda. Ben Kiwanuka was treated like a leper. The vested interests at Mengo formed a special purpose vehicle and called it a political party - Kabaka Yekka (KY). 

They coalesced with a complicit colonial power and resolved that in the 1962 elections the people of Buganda would have their MPs elected for them by the Lukiiko. The KY MPs then formed a coalition with UPC of Obote and they formed a government. That is what is commonly called the marriage of convenience. This locked Kiwanuka out of Parliament and kept DP out of power. That marriage of convenience soon collapsed. 

In 1986, the leaders of DP agreed to join Mr Museveni’s victorious National Resistance Movement (NRM) government which had been ushered into power by its guerrilla army - the National Resistance Army (NRA). That was not surprising because the disputed outcome of the 1980 election polarised the party. Some members believed that the party, having been denied the right to form government by fraud and force, should not have accepted to enter Parliament as the Opposition to the UPC government. 

Indeed some of the DP leaders had already started armed resistance from as far back as the time Prof Yusuf Lule was ousted from power. After the 1980 elections, more DP members decided to join the Bush War. Some joined the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMO), other joined the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) while others joined NRA. Many DP leaders took up ministerial positions under an informal arrangement that the then DP president called “gentleman’s agreement”. It turned out that he was the only gentleman because efforts to formalise the political alliance failed. 

After 10 years of a stalled democratisation process, DP leader Paul Ssemogerere walked out of government and announced that he would run against Mr Museveni in the 1996 elections.
Ever the big tent, big picture party, DP chose its old nemesis UPC as its partner. They formed the Inter-Political Forces Coalition (IPFC). The old foes became partners. Ssemogerere and Cecilia Ogwal traversed the country together. 

Unfortunately, like Kiwanuka in the 1960s, Ssemogerere was demonised by the NRM adherents claiming to speak for the interests of Buganda. He was smeared as a Trojan horse working for the return of Obote into power and as a front for the resurgence of the defeated and murderous Nilotics from the north. Ssemogerere swept the polls in Teso, West Nile, Acholi and Lango. The rest of the country shunned him. 

The Bantu-Nilotic divide was clear in 1996. But the IPFC alliance had unified the forces of change. It was based on maturity and it had a clear focus. Though the elections were under the “no-party individual merit” system the IPFC was spearheaded by well-established though weakened parties - DP and UPC. It was not personality driven. It was institutionally well grounded. No coalition since has galvanised the people like the IPFC. Next week we continue our audit of subsequent attempts at coalition building.