Trust networks often undermine democracy

Mr Michael Buteera Mugisha

In my previous article, following a robust debate, I posited that we ought to broaden the definition of the term democracy. 

A helpful search of analytical answers demands that we see democracy by assessing the extent to which public politics (that is to say citizen-state political relations or interaction) shifts from narrow, less equal, less protected and less mutually binding consultations to broader, equal, protected and mutually binding consultations. 

I invoked three factors that underlie this process: integration or withdrawal of trust networks, insertion or insulation of categorical inequalities from public politics and reduction or increase in autonomous centres of power within and outside the state. 

In this piece, I shall address the question of how trust networks reduce or increase the chances of democracy.

Scholars define trust networks as “ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to malfeasance, mistakes or failures of other.” Think about trust networks in context of say kinship groups or organisations such as kingdoms or clans, religious organisations and sects, and trade unions or professional associations. 

Historically, participants in these trust networks have always sought to shield themselves from political involvement. 

Although often lauded (and correctly so) for serving as anchors of ethical, moral values, promotion of social capital, and cushioning members from the parlous nature of economic capitalism, trust networks may undermine democracy by limiting the commitment of citizens to democratic collective enterprises. 

For example, it is common in Uganda, that despite the diverse faith and religious orientation, once in a while, one does not miss a service or Mass where the preacher summons us to the best human instincts: reminding us that although we may plough into the wheel of capitalism in which we are shaped to think like rational calculators obsessively and acutely attuned to pursue our economic interests, we need to care for  the needs of others. 

Thus, while some trust networks create structures for integration of citizens in the political community, once these identifiers become entrenched, democracy may sometimes be put paid. Why? 

First, segmentation of citizens, a likely outcome of trust networks, limits broader commitment to the collective enterprise of democracy, primarily because of the likely failure to aggregate or amalgamate potentially diverse interests running across various trust networks. 

Second, trust networks assert the need and relevancy of key figures who may in the long run become intermediaries between the state and trust networks, and thus forestall greater citizen participation in public politics. 

What, then, is the hope for democracy? Three possible pathways are posited, however, I will focus on the most important: the appearance of risky opportunities and threats that trust networks cannot handle, such as hyperinflation that erodes economic growth and thus forestall the capacity of trust networks to cushion members from risky threats. 

Some have argued that the current global biting economic conditions on governments, households and firms, driven by post-Covid supply chain glitches, and an energy crisis heralded by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, is likely to force governments to contend with more pressure from citizens. 

But these processes and events only create opportunities, the real work lies in the political mobilisation that is able to cut through the underwhelming nature of trust networks to create a citizen-led movement that can compel the state to acquiesce to citizen collective demands. 

Mr Michael Buteera Mugisha is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and lecturer at Makerere University.