Hang onto your helmet, clamp down on boda boda militia just a change of guard

It is tempting for long-suffering residents of Greater Kampala to see the on-going crackdown against the Boda Boda 2010 urban militia as a fundamental change in the way the city is governed, as enforcement of law and order, and as affirmation of the primacy of the rule of law. Recent history suggests it is a mere change of the city guard.
To understand this we need to see the Greater Kampala metropolitan area not just as a bustling, densely populated law enforcement challenge, but also as a political prize – and one the NRM government has never won but covets the most.
Attempts to win the hearts, minds and votes of the urban dwellers have followed various tricks, twists and turns. As early as 2001 one of the allegations heard in the unsuccessful Supreme Court presidential election petition was that the winning candidate had bribed voters in Greater Kampala with gifts of motorcycles, which were then quickly filling the vacuum in public transport left by the collapse of the urban bus transit system.
Other tactics since have included gentrifying parts of the city through new markets, taking advantage of the shock therapy of, say, fires to get rid of viper nests like Kisekka Market, exempting small-scale city traders from certain rents, to doling out cash to youth groups, while always maintaining a coercive arm against those unwilling to play ball.
The Kayunga Riots, the shifting sands of the Arab Spring and the walk-to-work protests of 2011 strengthened the regime’s coercive and defensive instincts.
Before long the police had poured into the streets to occupy public spaces and beat back political opponents and dissenters, becoming the new face of regime enforcement. The military, tired of questions from human rights groups and keen to put its best boots forward on its foreign peacekeeping missions, had outsourced most of the dirty work to the police.
This coincided with radical changes in a force that, under new management and with vastly improved resources, was in the process of hollowing out the ancient régime and building a new police force altogether.
These changes were both rapid and military in nature. Training methods were changed to mirror those of paramilitary forces, new recruits quickly promoted to senior ranks, and the old guard shunted aside or retired. Without the organic ties to the communities in which they operated, over enthusiastic cadres keen to catch the eye, and with the constant need to throttle opposition and civil society activism, the force that emerged was one with brand new leather boots but with feet of clay.
Without the homegrown network of informers that the old police officers had cultivated over the years, and with criminal elements within its own ranks, it was just a matter of time before slogans of community policing gave way to the reality of criminal policing.
Frightened ordinary citizens huddling in the corners of their homes hiding from robbers were advised to form neighbourhood whatsapp groups while the officers meant to protect them were deployed to protect robber barons or enforce their land and property grabs. Tapping into the tens of thousands of boda boda riders around the capital was a no-brainer. They are great for gathering intelligence and peer pressure is a useful tool in organising them to respect the law or common sense practices like wearing helmets.
What appears to have happened, instead, was a coming together of elements from the criminal underworld keen to offer political intelligence and regime enforcement in exchange for money and protection on one hand and, on the other, a police force keen to also outsource the nastiest bits of enforcement.
Thus when BB 2010 thugs flogged school children they mistook for opposition activists, there were no arrests. When they beat up dissenters? Silence. When their leaders grabbed land? Silence. Even when there were anecdotal tales linking them to more serious crimes of murder and robbery? Silence.
It appears that their downfall didn’t come from their criminality – that is what they do as a matter of course, anyway – but from trying to bite the political hands that feed them. There used to be honour, even among thieves.
Expect new iterations to emerge – one group demonstrated early promise by torching the BB 2010 offices – but it will take a change in the political considerations within the prized capital for a genuine clamp down on criminal gangs in Kampala.
Boda Boda 2010 might be down but the political mafia that operates on the fringes of the law and the criminal underworld is not out yet. Hang onto your helmets, for bumpy roads remain ahead.