Obote takes over president Muteesa’s powers after attempted coup

Mr Speaker, it is providence that has willed that I and my colleagues should be alive today after the meeting of this House on the February 4 this year [when Kabaka Yekka former secretary general Daudi Ochieng tabled a motion to impeach prime minister Obote, ministers Felix Onama, Adoko Nekyon and Col Idi Amin for their alleged involvement in the plundering of gold, ivory, coffee and money from Congo].

During the time that has elapsed from that day until today, this country has gone through a most difficult period. Those who were elected to come here to discuss matters of State, to discuss matters that affect citizens of this country, to discuss the welfare of the people who elected them, will probably recall the darkest Friday that this country ever witnessed since the creation of earth – that is February 4, 1966.

It was most unfortunate that I personally was not present on that day. I can now tell the country that immediately after those who talked in this House and those who listened went out, a lot of things happened, and by God’s grace this country received the bounty of the creator and was, therefore, not plunged into bloodshed.

Most of us have been thinking very seriously [about] what to do in order to give this country a basis that they will understand, and to rid this country of irresponsible ambitions and the desire that, because of accident of birth, somebody must direct as of right the affairs of State and the lives of our citizens who elected us to this place.

Uganda is composed of definite traditional organisations and on February 4, 1966, Uganda witnessed something that many of us hoped would never be a reality – that was the open and public exposition of the relation between master and servant, when the servant sits in this house, for the servant to deliver the goods to the master.

Innocent citizens would have suffered merely because an ambitious man [MP Ochieng], was brought into this House through friendship, who was brought into this House on promise that he would deliver Uganda on a silver plate to his master [Kabaka Edward Mutesa II],wanted to turn the whole of this country into the domain of one man.

Obote rejects request for army band
I want to tell the country that letters of this kind [Muteesa’s letters to premier Obote, minister of State for Defence Felix Onama and army commander Shaban Opolot asking for the army band to play at his birthday on November 19, 1965, at Mengo which Obote refused], resistance of this kind nearly brought me into trouble and nearly brought this country into trouble after February 4, 1966.

I am very clear in my own mind that the idea was not only to remove the government, but the idea was that some of us, particularly myself should not live at all.

The idea was that someone should take my place, someone who was amenable not to resist this kind of requests; someone who was amenable to give Mengo police posts which they lost in the Uganda High Court. Someone who was amenable to probably give back what used to be called the lost, but now are called recovered counties.

Now, this was in the background of the minds of the gentlemen who brought a motion in Parliament on February 4, 1966, and it was felt that immediately steps should be taken to get rid of Obote who was stopping one man [Muteesa] from being the feudal lord of Uganda. Thank God there was that Obote!

Obote foils first attempted coup
Indeed, it is known that immediately after Parliament adjourned on February 4, 1966, various meetings were held at Makindye [State Lodge] and various places around Kampala as to how best the government should be toppled before February 12, 1966, [the day Obote was to return from a working tour of West Nile and northern Uganda].

A government lawyer was summoned from another up-country station to come and give advice as to how best this government could be toppled and he was summoned by the president [Muteesa].

Meanwhile as all this was going on, an order was given to a contingent of the army in Jinja to move to Tooro on Sunday, February 5 [1966] in preparation for an operation there.

This movement of troops increased the undesired rumours around Kampala which have spread throughout the country. There were also some other movements of troops and weapons from Jinja to Mbuya army headquarters and to Entebbe. There is a report that several army trucks moved around Kampala throughout the nights of Sunday and Monday, February 6 and 7.

Amin ‘threatens to kill’ army commander
It is reported [Obote’s statement on February 9, 1966, from Arua] that some officers sought to arrest Col Amin during that night [February 7] but did not get hold of him and that this caused Col Amin to go into hiding. It is also reported that some officers called at various houses in Kampala and that neither their behaviour nor language were conducive to good order.

I received on Tuesday the 8th a letter from the commander of the army [Brig Shaban Opolot] informing me that while he was talking to Col Amin on the telephone, the colonel threatened to kill him. The commander wanted me to return in order to settle the matter.
I asked the commander and the secretary of defence to meet me the next day in Arua for the purpose of holding a defence council meeting to decide upon what action to take in the matter of threat. This meeting did not take place [Opolot did not travel to Arua]. I decided to send the minister of state for defence [Felix Onama] to Kampala to look into the matter.

I also advised the commander on February 8 in a letter to him that the proposal he had put to me to place Col Amin under ‘close arrest’ [house arrest] would only be done when there was a charge against the officer [Amin].

I have already issued two statements and I would like to talk about the matters which led me to issue those statements [Obote’s address to the Parliament], and matters which made those statements necessary – that is to say, why I did the most difficult decision, the most difficult road; to suspend the Constitution.

In doing this, I want now to say, that Constitution [of 1962] was worked out by representatives of this country, and for the good of this country. Behind it there was the idea, the hope and the belief that no one would try to use that Constitution to serve himself.
Admittedly, when that Constitution was being framed, there were disagreements and one can say it was a compromise on behalf of all that made us have that Constitution.

The issue, therefore, arises that one of the parties that consented to the compromise wanted to use his delegates in order to gain what he lost in the London Conference.

This is the issue now before the country; this was the matter before the House on February 4, 1966, but unfortunately, not many people saw it.

The trick was cleverly embellished, so much so that nobody here at this place was in a position to understand what was behind those who introduce the darkest period in our history, and those who nearly made this House to be the laughing-stock of any farmer, any muruka councillor, of any man in the street.

The standard of debate went so low that the House stopped immediately that day to be the standard in this country.

‘Muteesa asks Britain for mercenaries’
During my recent tour of the northern region [first week of February], the president [Muteesa] did not hesitate to summon some ambassadors accredited to this country, and made firm requests for military assistance.

Nobody with any stretch of imagination can make us believe that this was a constitutional act, and that the president was acting within the provisions of the Constitution when he summoned accredited ambassadors without notifying the foreign office or myself, or any other minister of the government, yet the people who pretend to be very concerned about the Constitution are telling us that these acts were in order and that the president acted constitutionally.

Let me ask, what are precautionary requests? On what authority did he make precautionary requests, on whose behalf did he make precautionary requests?

Since when did he become Executive to make requests of this kind for deadly weapons? Who is it that he wanted to fight? Why did he not tell the government of Uganda? In so far as I am concerned, I am convinced that he was plotting against the government of Uganda.

I want also to tell the country that the private secretary to the president [Kiggundu], in his statement of the March 4 did say the requests they made were based on two reasons.

Number one, they said because some army officers had reported to have been under arrest. Let me tell them that it is not too late for them to publish the names of the army officers who were under any kind of arrest on the day they made the so called ‘precautionary requests’.

I can, however, tell the country that their stand is absolutely not true. I can also tell the country that there was at this time only one army officer [Brig Opolot] under ‘open arrest’ which is contained in the 1964 Armed Forces Act. This particular officer was put under ‘open arrest’ in October 1965 [when the Uganda Army went to Congo] and not in February 1966.

Rebels in Mbale forests
Then they [president Muteesa’s statement issued by Kiggundu] gave a second reason. They said they made their so-called ‘precautionary requests’ because some statements had been made in the National Assembly on February 4 this year to the effect that some 70 youth were being trained in the forests of Mbale to overthrow the government and the Constitution.

To my mind, I would say first there was the attempt to get the National Assembly to believe that 70 youth were being trained in order to set up a platform for the so-called ‘precautionary requests’ to bring to this country foreign troops.

He [president Muteesa] made the requests privately, but using the name of presidency – merely because according to his own statement, someone had told him that statements had been made in this place that some 70 youth were being trained in the forests of Mbale to overthrow the government and Constitution.

I am not going to say this kind of reasoning is very childish, because it was not made by children, but I am going to say this particular statement must not be rejected lightly.

Now, in that Constitution which we have had since October 9, 1962, there was a definite provision for the president to ask the prime minister or any minister for information regarding any affairs of the State.

I can tell the country that this fear of 70 youth drove the president to run to a foreign government for troops, he never requested any of the ministers to let him know the position; he never sent a word to me; he kept quiet. He preferred to listen to [Ochieng] his own friend.

I submit, therefore, that there was no necessity whatsoever for Sir Edward, bearing in mind the fact that we have the police, the army and prison services, to have gone to a foreign ambassador instead of asking the government to ensure that the alleged 70 youth could be easily contained by our forces.

Apparently, the president lost all confidence in the Uganda police before making the precautionary requests.

He lost all confidence in the Uganda Army, but he did not resign his position of commander- in-chief before making the precautionary requests. I do not know whether these requests have now been withdrawn, but I want to tell the country that our forces are ready any time.

I want to tell the country that we cannot only depend on the statement which came from Makindye [State Lodge in Kampala] on the precautionary requests. The diplomat [British High Commissioner to Uganda], concerned himself, has written to me acknowledging that he was asked about this military assistance.

Obote learns of coup plot
Now, I would have contained the situation had it been only this matter of precautionary request. And indeed on February 14 and 15 we had full discussions in the Cabinet and on February 15 I sent two notes to the president.
Then I went to Kenya to attend the meeting of the East African Common Services. I returned on February 19 and came to Kampala; I remained in Kampala until fairly late, but in the evening I came to know that without the knowledge of the minister of Defence, without any information to me whatsoever, and without the knowledge of anybody, arrangements had been made for the 1st Battalion of Uganda Army to go for training in Bunyoro for two weeks, 3rd Battalion Uganda Army to go for training for two weeks and three days in Bunyoro, and the 4th Battalion Uganda Army to go for training for two weeks in Kizinga, South Ankole.

This came to me towards midnight on February 19 and troops were to begin moving to take their position by about February 21.

I had to summon the minister of State for Defence immediately and I had to write a letter that very night to the minister and to the commander [Shaban Opolot] of the army cancelling this training arrangement.

Now about the same time, some Members of Parliament were meeting in a house here at Kololo; about the same time I was dictating my letter cancelling training arrangement, some members were meeting.

They met in one house then they moved into another house and they were talking about this training arrangement.

Obote outwits the second coup plotters
Then on Monday 21, a senior police officer went to Makindye [State Lodge] to report to the president about the situation.

After the police officer had reported to the president, the president asked whether the officer knew of what was going to happen on February 22. Obviously the officer did not know, and then the president immediately said, ‘Oh do not worry, this is one of the Kampala rumours.’

But the [Muganda] officer felt that this was important. So immediately after leaving the president, he came to see me and he told me that he had been asked about the 22nd.

I said we better find out what is going to happen on the 22nd, but as far as I know, I have already cancelled the army movements. I moved therefore to Kampala and I found that this was really the day – it was to happen on the 22nd and that most of the troops would be in training and just a small section would have been used.

I went back to Entebbe and at around 3 O’clock at night, alone, I decided to act as I did on February 22, 1966.

If I had not acted on that day, if it was not that I had got this programme of training, perhaps we would have gone into a greater chaos. No one would say anyone of us would have been alive today.”