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Why the gun may not serve Muhoozi
Author: Moses Khisa. PHOTO/FILE
What you need to know:
- Gen Kainerugaba, by contrast, appears to rest wholly on exercising the raw power of the gun and commanding armed subordinates
President Yoweri Museveni is essentially a military ruler. His rulership is draped in civilian garb, but the core foundation, orientation and anchor is fundamentally military. He came to power in 1986 through the barrel of the gun and consolidated his rule for close to 40 years primarily by effectively marshalling control over deploying the gun.
He procures legitimacy through elections by using the power of the gun. The ballot is secured by the bullet. In all, Museveni has been a quintessential specialist in violence with a mastery of the primacy of monopolising the exercise of force and violence.
But Museveni is not just a master of the military, he is equally a skilful political tactician who understood from the outset that brute force alone would not secure him in power for the long haul.
The art of politics is multifaceted. It requires a multiplicity of resources and endowments. Deploying force is critical. It has been a decisive factor for Museveni, but the efficient use of finance is equally important. Intimating opponents and projecting a muscular demeanour matters, but so does displaying charisma and oratory.
The threat of physical force in donning military fatigues serves well in some circumstances, while the charm of a business suit is effective in other situations. Sometimes, it is enough to put boots on the ground to broadcast fear and quell potential protests, other times it makes a difference to speak to the public with poise and persuasion.
Museveni has mustered the art of juggling these different aspects of control, dominance and manipulation to rule for so long. In the final analysis though, when push comes to shove, his default political base is the military and his ultimate source of power is the bullet, not ballot.
Can the son who is apparently focused on taking over from the father replicate the latter’s modus operandi? Highly unlikely. Last week, I ended by noting that the path and process that gave Museveni power and sustained him this long – the force of arms – may not work for Muhoozi.
For one, the times are quite different. The social and political environment of 1986 is markedly different from that of 2023 or 2026. The predominant role of the gun in 1986 is in many ways untenable today. Museveni’s politics from 1986 entailed demystifying the gun, heretofore the symbol of state terror and source of fear among the public. For what it is worth, the average Ugandan today is not scared at the sight of a gun.
Museveni’s opponents after 1986 fought him in the same way he had come to power, by way of guerrilla insurgency. Today, Muhoozi’s opponents will unlikely launch armed rebellion in the countryside. Rather, they will most likely oppose him right from the seat of power through unarmed militancy and popular civilian uprising quite difficult to put down merely through the power of the gun.
Gen Museveni likes touting his military prowess and fighting credentials, referring to himself as the sabalwanyi – the chief fighter. But arguably his biggest skill is that of a political operative able to hold the gun in the backseat and draw it only when it is most needed.
Gen Kainerugaba, by contrast, appears to rest wholly on exercising the raw power of the gun and commanding armed subordinates. He has so far showed a shocking lack of charisma, unable to articulate a coherent message to the public whether on Twitter or at public rallies.
Worse, while the father spoke so forcefully and compellingly to the fundamental problems Uganda faced in 1986, and indeed for all the years he has been in power even though not managing to tackle them, on his part Muhoozi has demonstrably fallen short.
Sometime last year during the flurry of birthday celebration activities, Gen Kainerugaba spoke at a rally. He addressed himself to the youth problem. In a short video clip that made rounds, he said ‘the problem of the youth is sports and entertainment’!
It appears he really intended to say that to tackle youth problems you need to invest in sports and entertainment, two areas that appeal to young people. But to reduce the solution to those two areas is to fail to grasp Uganda’s youth bulge with millions of unemployed and unemployable youths, which cannot be cured by sports and entertainment regardless of how much investment channelled there.
As I argued last week, given ‘Museveni-fatigue,’ a family member, whether son, son-in-law or brother, has to be at his very best in making the case to succeed the current ruler.
Beyond his credentials as a four-star general who has been to the best war colleges around the world, so far Gen Kainerugaba has a very weak case, below average in convincing a sceptical and hostile public.
He has been underwhelming and incapable of navigating the rough political waters in a country facing enormous socioeconomic and political problems. The gun alone can’t save him.
