Why Muhoozi’s bid to succeed the father is indefensible

Author: Moses Khisa. PHOTO/FILE

What you need to know:

  • With all the ‘Museveni-fatigue’ among Ugandans, his son has to score very highly on merit to find favour among the public...

Sometime in late 2012, I received a request from the Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) based in Dakar, Senegal to read and write a review of a book titled Battles of the Ugandan Resistance: A Tradition of Manoeuvre.

The book was published in 2010. The author was Muhoozi Kainerugaba, a lieutenant colonel in the Uganda People’s Defence Forces and commander of the Special Forces Brigade. I initially demurred but later agreed to the request.

At this time, 2012, the author was a brigadier, commanding the vastly expanded and renamed Special Forces Command, better resources, equipped and viewed as a quasi-army within an army.

In what was a longish review essay (available online), I opened by noting that Brig Kainerugaba was arguably Uganda’s most trained army officer having attended prestigious war colleges around the world including Sandhurst in the UK and Fort Leavenworth in the USA.

For an academic, especially one imbibed with the scepticism of a PhD student, which is what I was, I wondered whether there was anything in a book written by an army officer. In any event, I granted the book the benefit of the doubt, read it cover-to-cover. It was a worthy read.

The narrative in the text was tightly crafted and cogently written. It was impressive. I subjected the book to the same professional review standard expected of an academic book review to be published in an academic journal.

The overall argument was compelling even if one disagreed with its premises and the evidence adduced. The central claim of the book was that there is an African way of war, distinct from the West, captured in one word: manoeuvre.

Lt. Col Kainerugaba used the experience of the National Resistance Army (NRA) rebel group, with some smatterings of events elsewhere in Africa, to conclude that Africans engage in warfare in ways that privilege a manoeuvre approach rather than annihilation and total destruction, where victory is attained with minimal casualties and costs.

I underlined a range of flaws, but overall I praised the book as an important contribution to the literature on conflict, war and Africa’s military history. One of the book’s strengths was its sourcing: the author interviewed the most important actors in the NRA – the author’s own father and commander-in-chief, Yoweri Museveni, Generals Elly Tumwiine and Salim Saleh, among others.

My review concluded as follows: ‘In sum, Brig Muhoozi Kainerugaba has written a book that is worth reading and re-reading. The author demonstrates excellent understanding of the history of the NRA’s evolution from a guerrilla force to a national and professional army. He also does well in bringing into the discussion important theoretical insights although, in some instances, the attempt to make theoretical claims based on historical facts and vice-versa is a little bit superficial, if not too mechanical.’

This book was the closest I came to knowing Kainerugaba, then a one-star general. Fast forward to 2022, and enter Lieutenant General, later General, Kainerugaba who took Twitter by storm.  The difference between the Muhoozi whose book I praised a decade ago and the one Tweeting gibberish and unthoughtful pronouncements couldn’t be starker. What had happened in the intervening period? How could a lieutenant colonel write a compelling book yet as a full general come off so pedestrian, unreflective and unwise in public speak?

All this would be utterly irrelevant except that Muhoozi is on a full throttle campaign to become Uganda’s next president ostensibly in 2026, taking over from his father, our ruler of close to 40 years uninterrupted.

Many Ugandans, your columnist inclusive, knew nothing about the persona and calibre of a man long rumoured as presidential heir apparent until he took to Twitter, participated in public processions and rallies all in total violation of the basic rules governing the armed forces.  If he wasn’t the first son, and apparently preparing to succeed the father, Gen Kainerugaba should long have been charged and prosecuted for, among other things, conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline and engaging in harmful propaganda. These are crimes previous senior army officers were charged with, more over for acts a tiny fraction of Muhoozi’s.

Violating the constitution and engaging in conduct unbecoming of an army officer would perhaps be infractions some Ugandans can ignore if Muhoozi offered a refreshing and appealing slate. By any measure, he doesn’t.

Away from Twitter and at the rallies he has addressed, he demonstrates inability to articulate any programmatic ideas or provide a coherent interpretation and solutions to our most pressing problems.  With all the ‘Museveni-fatigue’ among Ugandans, his son has to score very highly on merit to find favour among the public in making the case for succeeding the father. There is, of course, the option of taking over from the father in the same way the latter came to power – through force of arms! This though is complicated, to which I shall turn next.