Could Ntaganda’s ‘arrest’ signal end of rebellion in eastern DRC?

And so it came to pass that Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, indicted in the International Criminal Court (ICC), presented himself at the US Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda and surrendered.

Gen. Ntaganda, who has been the object of an ICC arrest warrant, is a former commander in the Congolese Armed Forces. The Rwanda government, in spite of ‘winks’ from regional observers, denied any knowledge of Ntaganda’s presence on Rwandan soil and how he appeared at the US Embassy.

And the US authorities, playing along in a game of pure diplomatics, asked Rwandan authorities to accord them safe passage when carting Ntaganda to the Hague in the Netherlands.

It is not my interest to reveal the depth of Rwanda’s involvement in ‘guiding’ Ntaganda to the US Embassy. However, if one followed the M23 rebellion since April 2012, there are several clues and hints suggesting the removal of Gen. Ntaganda from the theatre of war would be in the interests of Rwanda.

It is therefore not improbable (please mark the double negatives) that Rwandan authorities had a hand in having Ntaganda on the chopping board if only for a reprieve to ease the pressure from the international community bent on having Ntaganda prosecuted in the Hague.

The question though is: Will Ntaganda’s departure from the theatre of war end the incessantly unending rebellions always associated with Rwandan support or sympathy?

Rwanda’s challenges
In July 2012, the US, Netherlands, Sweden and Germany withdrew or delayed disbursement of their budgetary support to Rwanda in protest of Rwanda’s alleged support for M23 Congolese rebels.

In response, Rwanda started a national sovereign fund called Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF) . It was expected to cover up the fissures created by the suspension and delayed budgetary support from the donors. But in less than a year, it was clear that the withdrawals or delays of donor funds was hurting the economy; notwithstanding the locally sourced funds in AgDF.

It was therefore consequent that insecurity in eastern DR Congo (the vortex of which was the M23 rebellion and the ICC arrest warrant on Ntaganda) would continue shaping Rwanda’s foreign relationship with donors in Europe and America. And as is commonplace in such circumstances, Rwanda had to deal to heal.

End of rebellions?
After the ‘arrest’ of Ntaganda, there is a feeling of relief that engenders hope; a hope that this could the end of rebellions in eastern DRC. Most of the rebellions in eastern DRC are inspired or actually informed by the ethno-political dynamics in post-genocide Rwanda. It is not uncommon that a rebel leader would say that they took up arms to protect the Tutsi ethnic community in eastern DRC.
Yet until 1990, the Kinyarwanda speaking communities in eastern DRC were not known for this Tutsi-Hutu ethnic dichotomy.

And it is important to note that most of the Kinyarwanda speaking communities in eastern DRC and northern Rwanda had Hutu traditional leadership. In fact, former Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu comes from a pre-colonial chiefly family in the former Prefecture of Gisenyi.

Jean Bertrand Bisimwa, the current president of M23 is a Mushi, as is the wife of former rebel leader Gen. Laurent Nkunda. The Abashi, a minority community that straddles across the DRC-Rwanda, are of course very insignificant in DRC and Rwanda. Whereas in Rwanda the biggest divide is Hutu-Tutsi, the Abashi are recognised as a distinct group as Abashi.

There are Banyawbishi, Bahunde, Bafulero etc. All these communities speak Kinyarwanda dialect and had traditional Hutu leadership recognised by the authorities in Kinshasa.

So, if the international community acts in a way that would discourage the ethno-political dynamics in Rwanda to inspire Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese into rebellion, it is likely that Ntaganda’s arrest would be a lesson for any group or individuals harbouring ideas of rebellion.

Even when they posture as revolutionaries, most of the previous rebel leaders have ended up disillusioned for associating with a rebellion that cannot muster national appeal among all the Congolese. Leaders like Earnest Wamba dia Wamba, Jean Pierre Ondekane, Dr. Emile Illunga, Azarius Ruberwa and Bizima Karaha have in one way or the other abandoned rebellions disappointed by their cadres and regional powers.
Even former Vice President Jean Pierre Bemba had to appeal to his Mobutist background (Mobutu and Bemba were in-laws) to force a re-run in 2006 elections.

The current crop of rebel leaders even lacks a background of ideological clarity and revolutionary fervour. So, even if they scored quick victories on the battle field, they would not appeal to the national psyche.

The most important ingredient in the rebellions in east DRC has been support or sympathy from the regional powers Uganda and Rwanda. Incidentally, there seems to be a recognition that support for (Congolese) rebels with no ideological grounding is wasteful and doesn’t bring any strategic benefits.

On that premise, there is unlikely to be a vicious rebellion in the DRC. However, the challenge now is to bring the diplomatic efforts of regional powers Uganda and Rwanda to bear on the DRC government and the remnant of the M23 rebels. The framework of this diplomatic effort is already in place, at the centre of which is President Museveni’s mediation skills. The M23 rebels (or what remains of them) and the DRC government are still technically involved in peace talks in Kampala.
This diplomatic engagement is under a resolution of the International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the crisis. Very soon, the profile of the ICGLR will grow in a manner and stature like that of IGGAD when it brokered an agreement between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudan government.

Anecdote on Kivu
Contrary to the common tagging of ‘mineral-rich’, both South North Kivu provinces are actually NOT very much mineral endowed; that is if one compared them with other provinces of the DRC.
Goma was actually established as a summer town (some kind of retreat) for the predominantly Greek miners in Maniema Province. The houses on Lake Kivu’s waterfront are a testimony to the town’s holidaying architectural theme.

In fact Kivu was more known for its expansive plantation and mixed farms than the minerals that are touted these days. And most of these farming concerns were, like the mining concessions in Maniema Province, still predominantly owned by Greeks.

The cattle rearing farms in Masisi, if it were not for the destruction visited on them by the fleeing Force Armee Rwandaise (FAR), would still compare well with the commercial farms in Kenya or South Africa.
The Greeks running Maniema mining concessions and Kivu commercial farms married or ‘befriended’ local Tutsi girls. And with these mixed marriages, came social mobility of an ethnic minority to constitute the elite of the communities.

This mobility resulted into a vertical self-consciousness that was later to feed on the post-genocide ethno-political dynamics in Rwanda.
In spite of the assumed cross-border solidarity of the Kinyarwanda speaking communities in eastern DRC, all Congolese (even the Tutsi), are highly patriotic and don’t want to be called Rwandans.

Asuman Bisiika is the Executive Editor of East Africa Flagpost