How Kazini, Ssemakula revived Uganda fortunes

Brig James Kazini (4th left), with the Uganda People’s Defence Forces. Kazini exhibited exceptional tactics and strategic prowess, including successful ambushes, coordinated operations, and capturing key towns and positions during the conflict in DR Congo. Photo | File 

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  • Events in October and November of 1998 that saw the rebels make inroads in Kabila Sr’s birthplace of Moba (Katanga Province) after initially struggling to beat a retreat will forever be immortalised. In the fifth instalment of this series around the Second Congo War, Emmanuel Mutaizibwa gives details of how the belligerents made the most of President Mugabe’s sacking of his Chief of Staff and how the arrival of daredevil fighters from the third and ninth UPDF battalions provided a tonic.

Brig James Kazini, a veteran of trench warfare, built his impenetrable fortress at Kapalata, across Tshopo River bridge on the outskirts of Kisangani City, the capital of Tshopo Province. Inside his lair, he was able to take the war towards the DR Congo fighters and their allies.

The Monitor spoke to various sources, including soldiers who were deployed in the deeper DRC jungles recesses to fight in this intractable conflict that sucked in more than 10 African countries.

By the end of October 1998, Uganda needed to shore up its numbers as the DRC and its allied fighters ramped up their firepower. It didn’t help matters that its alliance with Rwanda had gradually crumbled as a result of mutual suspicion, ego and destructive poker games, resulting in a shootout at the Beni-Isoro axis in Haut Uele district, north-eastern DRC.

“In 1998, we landed in Kisangani at Bangoka Airport and moved to Kapalata, a town outside Kisangani. This was the third, fifth, seventh and ninth battalions that fought most of the Congo war from 1998 to 2001. The commanders of these units were daredevil fighters, who had fought during the NRA war, [Alice] Lakwena and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) [Under Joseph Kony],” a UPDF soldier, who fought in the DRC conflict and spoke on a condition of anonymity, revealed, adding, “The most prominent one was [the late] Col Sula Ssemakula, who commanded the third battalion. When they reached Kapalata, they were briefed  by then Brig James Kazini again about the operation. They were told the  operation was against ADF.”

Daredevil fighters

These troops were divided into various sectors. Seventh and ninth battalions were deployed to advance and capture Basankusu sector in the Equateur Province. Elsewhere, the third and fifth battalions were deployed in Buta, Bas-Uele District, Orientale Province.

Within two days of their deployment, the third battalion under Col Ssemakula advanced and captured Buta Airport. It later pitched camp at River Banelia, a tributary of River Congo. In this sector, the UPDF were facing the fire-power and air-force combat planes of the Chadians, Sudanese, Namibians and Angolans, who had deployed both in the Ugandan and Rwandan sectors.

To capture Buta, which was under the Zimbabweans and Congolese fighters, Brig Kazini briefed his protégé Col Ssemakula to pick out the best fighters and snipers from A and B coys to form one coy that would face the enemy in the coming days.

“This coy was put on standby and on the day of the attack, Brig Kazini told Ssemakula to first shell the Zimbabwean and Congolese positions before the selected coy crossed the river using canoes hired from the civilians. The shelling started in the morning using Katushya rocket launchers as the fighters crossed the river. The Congolese and Zimbabweans fled. The coy was commanded by the late Kawene Lugemwa, who was later killed during the Kisangani war with the Rwanda Defence Forces,” recalls the soldier, who was deployed in one of the fighting groups.

The journey from Kapalata to Buta was littered with perils as the Ugandan army tried to navigate an ailing road network with heavy artillery equipment. The officers, relying on logs, built make-shift bridges to cross rivers and tributaries while carrying guns like 14mm, 82mm, 60mm and 120mm rifles and Katushyas. Three days after their long trek, they were able to bathe and wash their clothes upon reaching Baneria.

After capturing Buta, Col Ssemakula was transferred to Bafwasende, along Lindi River, Tshopo Province. He was replaced by Maj Siraje Makona, who had served as his deputy. The command structure was rearranged and Col Rwakanengyere became the sector commander of Buta, while Col Chris Kazoora was the overall Operations Commander of the sector. Two months later, Lt Col Tumusiime Nyakaitana was appointed Operations Commander as the soldiers planned to advance to Dulia, near the Central African Republic to fight the Chadians.


Chadian ambush

As they were advancing, the late President Laurent Kabila ordered that the UPDF should be fought and pushed out of Congo. Sudan planes under the command of Gen Omar Al-Bashir were used to transport Chadians, who tried to attack UPDF but were repulsed. The plan was to capture Dulia town, Orientale province.

“As [the UPDF troops] were advancing to capture Dulia, they found little resistance from the Congolese soldiers and the plan by the Congolese was to lure them into the Chadian ambush,” a source disclosed, adding, “Before Dulia town, the UPDF crossed a small river and entered the Chadian ambush. They were attacked with guns mounted on pick-up trucks, which they had dug and positioned in the trenches. They fought for more than three hours and the UPDF withdrew after losing 17 soldiers.  Maj Makona ordered them to withdraw.”

Chad built heavy defensive positions. A coy, which was now under the late Lt Taremwa, who was later killed by the Janjaweed in 2010 during the operations against LRA in Central African Republic, withdrew. After suffering losses to the Chadians, Gen Kazini, our source revealed, “hurriedly recalled Col Ssemakula from Bafasende to again command operations in the Equatorial Sector. He replaced Lt Col Nyakaitana.”

Tactical genius

The source revealed further, “When Ssemakula returned, he re-organised the troops and laid an ambush across the river for days. Ssemakula was liked and the morale was again high. There was no movement for days. The Chadians thought the UPDF had withdrawn. They came from their defensive positions and advanced across the bridge. Ssemakula gave an order that no one should fire before he ordered. On the third day, at about 8pm, the Chadians entered the ambush and they were decimated. They fought until midnight until the Chadians fled and left behind all the fighting equipment.”

Brig James Kazini. Photo | File

Ssemakula later ordered his UPDF troops to stop shelling. He gave ground troops the all clear to advance. The UPDF soldiers followed them for about three kilometres and sank a ferry the Chadians were using to cross River Congo,” recalls a source who participated in the ambush against the Chadians.

“During the battle, two Chadian colonels were killed. One of them had in fact trained with Ssemakula in Nigeria. Ssemakula, touched by the loss, recognised, saluted the corpse and removed the peeps from the body of an officer who was part of his cohort at the military academy. The area was littered with bodies.”

The Ugandans advanced and took over the Chadian positions and captured Dulia town. A day after, they advanced and captured Bumba town where many Chadian soldiers were buried. Lt James Nyondo, who was commanding Wreck Platoon, chased the Chadians up to the banks of R. Congo and hit their ferry with a recoilless gun. Many of the fleeing fighters drowned.

Toasting to success

A week after, the UPDF left Bumba town on the banks of the Congo River, Mongola Province. It was under the control of Pierre Bemba’s Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) fighters.

The UPDF advanced to Katokola, a training school for commanders. A few days later, Gen Kazini sent a message that A coy and half B coy should go to Abuzi (Equateur Province) where the ninth battalion under Lt Col Kiyingi was battling Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe was giving the ninth battalion a bloody nose.

The UPDF troops walked day and night until they reached Abuzi. This supporting force of about 300 soldiers under Col Ssemakula’s care would eventually reinforce Lt Col Kiyingi. When the force reached Abuzi, Gen Kazini ordered that Col Ssemakula should lead the fight against Zimbabwe troops. They landed in an ambush of Zimbabwe fighters, which they dispersed with the reliance of T-55 tanks.

“Barely after rescuing the ninth battalion in Abuzi, Ssemakula and his forces were ordered to go back to Kotakolo. From Kotakolo, they moved to Gbadolite, which had been captured by the fifth battalion under [the late] Maj John Bwirizayo. Third, fifth and ninth battalions assembled in Gbadolite [Nord-Ubangi province] in preparation to advance to Kinshasa. As a way of bolstering their morale, President Museveni gave them 200 cows to eat and thanked them for the successful battles they had fought,” our source recalls.

Later, some troops were ordered to move to Basankusu in the Equatuer Province, which was under Col Fred Ssegamwenge. The rest were to remain in Gbadolite. But as they were still in Gbadolite, a message was sent that third and fifth battalions must immediately deploy in Kisangani. This came at the time undercurrents between Uganda and Rwanda, continued to burble below the radar.

Earlier on, the DRC government forces, alongside allies, recaptured the town of Moba on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Kinshasa claimed its troops “killed about 1,000 rebel fighters.” The government used tanks, long-range bombers and the air-force and was bolstered by forces from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad, as reported by AFP.

Dining with the devil

In a retaliatory response, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe, in early November of 1998 held secret talks with senior LRA rebels political wing in London. They rendezvoused at Mugabe’s presidential suite in London’s Hilton Hotel, Park Lane.

The meeting in the affluent West End of London was arranged by Zimbabwe’s High commissioner to the UK, Ngoni Togarepi Chideya. The LRA was led by its political affairs head, Richard Nyekorach Matsanga. Mugabe had accused Museveni of backing anti-Mugabe elements. On its part, the LRA asked for logistical and financial support so that they could join the war front and back Kabila.

On November 24, 1998, Museveni held a strategic High Command meeting with the UPDF top brass to devise a new strategy for the fighting. It came a week after he met then Rwanda’s Vice President and Defence minister Paul Kagame. Their tête-à-tête dwelt on how to resolve emerging disputes and form a joint fighting agenda. 

On November 25, 1998, the AFP reported that the DRC troops shot an aircraft carrying ammunition at Kalemie airport. This was when the rebels were unloading military supplies by Zimbabwe combat planes barely after a joint offensive by allied forces had kicked off in earnest. Kalemie, a town that lies on the western shores of Lake Tanganyika in the mineral-rich Katanga province, was a stronghold of the rebels.

The belligerents had taken broad swathes of the eastern DRC. Barges ferrying rebel forces from Kalemie to Moba on the shores of Lake Tanganyika were sank, where hundreds lost their lives

In late November of 1998, this newspaper reported that Uganda had imported 90 tanks from Russia to bolster its offensive at various fronts, including DRC. The tanks, we added, were stuck in Tanzania, with a source attributing it to “a hitch.”  “The Tanzanian government has refused to provide military escort as they usually do for other military equipment,” a source in the UPDF told this newspaper then.

Then Samia Bugwe North MP, Aggrey Awori (RIP) claimed that the Museveni government had spent about Shs41 billion to import the equipment and was planning to table a motion in Parliament to impeach the President for sanctioning the deployment of the army without Parliament’s nod and only seeking retrospective approval.

Rwanda, Uganda clash

The Sunday Monitor reported that from December 11 to16, 1998, UPDF and RPA troops clashed in separate battles. One of the battles was in the Beni-Isiro axis, where both forces had deployed troops against Kabila. UPDF reportedly lost eight soldiers, while RPA lost 30 soldiers.

It came at the time Kagame wrote to Museveni, asking him to replace Brig Kazini “who is accused of hating Banyarwanda.” In a riposte, Kazini told this newspaper thus: “Why and how can I hate Banyarwanda or Kagame? Even in school, I was together with Kagame and we used to protect him when other students wanted to beat him. At school, we told other students that it was wrong to persecute someone because of his race.”

The bubbling undercurrents would, however, culminate in a fiercely contested battle in Kisangani.

In the next instalment, we will see how Uganda and Rwanda, erstwhile allies whose bond was built in the crucible of the NRA rebellion in Luweero triangle, clashed in a shooting war that led to the death of hundreds in the war-wracked Kisangani City.

Kazini profile

1957 - Born in Bushenyi.

1981 - Joined Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) rebellion.

1983 - Joined National Resistance Army/Movement under Yoweri Museveni in the Luweero Triangle.

1988 - Promoted and commissioned to captain.

1989 - Promoted to major and appointed commandant of military police.

1991- Promoted to lieutenant colonel and posted to the Mechanised Regiment in Masaka.

1995 - Posted to West Nile to fight West Nile Bank Front of Juma Oris

1996 - Promoted to colonel and appointed 4th Division Deputy Commander in Gulu

1998 -Posted to Kasese to fight the ADF in the Ruwenzori region

1999 - Appointed Chief of Staff and promoted to brigadier.

 2000 - Named commander of Operation Safe Haven

 2001 - Made Army Commander, a title now renamed Chief of Defence Forces.